

# The Jurisprudential and Legal Duty and Responsibility of the State and Passive Defense Against Domestic Cultural and Social Threats

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## Abstract

The Passive Defense Organization is an institution tasked with identifying threats within the target society and devising strategies to prevent or counteract them. Among the significant categories of threats are those concerning culture and social issues, whose neglect may lead to severe consequences. One of the key methods employed by foreign adversaries against any nation is the attack on its cultural and social domains, such as speech patterns, behaviors, clothing, education, upbringing, and similar areas. Societies with ancient cultures and distinctive worldviews are always at risk of such threats. A prominent example of this type of threat, which resulted in the collapse and defeat of an entire society, was the fall of Al-Andalus (Spain). After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the establishment of a religious government based on Islamic injunctions, foreign enemies began launching threats in the field of culture and social affairs and advanced significantly in various areas. Islamic jurisprudence has long provided guidelines regarding culture and social issues for the Islamic community and has guided the Muslim nation toward safeguarding these domains. This research, which is theoretical in nature and utilizes Islamic jurisprudential data and governmental decrees through a case-study method, seeks to examine the strategic role of passive defense in countering threats by drawing on Islamic jurisprudential sources. The findings of the study indicate that Islamic jurisprudence has consistently aimed to guide the Islamic society in all times and places. Passive defense, by drawing upon these divine injunctions, can respond promptly and effectively to such threats.

**Keywords:** enforcement guarantee, international instruments, Iranian law, women's rights

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## 1. Introduction

Scholars and experts in national security and defense studies classify threats in contemporary analysis into *external* and *internal* categories, each manifesting in various dimensions such as political, cultural, social, economic, human resources, and environmental (Ashouri, 2017; Danesh Pour, 2012). In recent years, the traditional military aspect of external threats and large-scale invasions has largely faded due to multiple factors, including international pressures, heavy human casualties, and significant economic costs. These conventional forms now rarely occur except under extraordinary conditions, being replaced

by political, international, and economic pressures—such as economic sanctions—and by cultural and social threats, including soft warfare, cyberattacks, and other nonconventional hostilities (Shojaei, 2019).

The issue of *cultural and social threats* and the notion of *cultural and social passive defense* is a relatively new field within passive defense studies (Tavakoli & Razmi, 2013). With this expanded understanding of threats and their broad reach, the responsibility for cultural and social passive defense is not limited to the Passive Defense Organization alone. Although that organization's primary mandate is external threats, the single article establishing the Passive Defense Organization and the general policies communicated by the Supreme Leader of Iran have placed the safeguarding of national security directly and indirectly on all state managers and officials (Shojaei, 2019). Cultural and social passive defense specifically concerns the Passive Defense Organization and those responsible for cultural and social affairs but, more broadly, involves all branches of the state (Tavakoli & Razmi, 2013).

This article first discusses the definitions of *national and internal security* and *passive defense*, then elaborates on the significance, necessity, and objectives of passive defense. Later sections examine threats, their various forms and manifestations, especially cultural and social issues that escalate into threats, their indicators, strategies, and requirements for mitigation through cultural and social passive defense. The article concludes that given the presence of cultural and social challenges—some rising to the level of threats and triggering public dissatisfaction—the government, particularly cultural and social managers and the Passive Defense Organization, must fulfill their assigned duties as set forth in the Vision Document, five-year development plans, and annual budget frameworks. Oversight bodies, especially the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament), as well as senior executive and judicial managers, must monitor the performance of mid-level and provincial managers to ensure accountability and replace inefficient officials with competent ones when necessary (Shojaei, 2019; Tavakoli & Razmi, 2013). Finally, the study addresses the jurisprudential and legal responsibilities that apply to managers and officials in these contexts (Hosseini Dashti, 2000; Yazdāniān, 2007).

## 2. Research Subject Analysis

### 2.1. Security: Linguistic and Terminological Perspectives

In language, *security* (amn) signifies calmness, safety, peace, and freedom from fear (Dehkhoda, 1946). Its technical meaning remains close to its lexical sense: the absence of fear and the state of being safe from danger (Ashouri, 2017). In other words, it denotes a condition free from any threat or attack or readiness to confront them (Danesh Pour, 2012). Among its various types, one is *internal security*, defined as the state's ability to establish order, enforce law, maintain peace, and meet the rational needs and expectations of its people (Danesh Pour, 2012).

### 2.2. Passive Defense: Linguistic and Terminological Perspectives

The Persian term *padāfand* (defense) derives from “pad/pād” meaning *against or counter to* and “āfand” meaning *hostility, attack, enmity, war, or combat* (Farāhīdī, 1985; Rāghib Isfahānī, 1983). Combined, it means “defense against attack.” In technical usage, *defense* encompasses all measures employing resources, equipment, and tactical methods to prevent the enemy's entry into national territory and destroy hostile forces (Tavakoli & Razmi, 2013).

Passive defense (*padafand gheyr-e 'amel*; Passive Defense) refers specifically to non-military actions that reduce the vulnerability of human resources, structures, facilities, equipment, documents, and national arteries against hostile and destructive operations (Shojaei, 2019). Put simply, it is a set of measures taken to minimize potential damages in the event of war or aggression. Facing certain threats is inevitable for any sovereign state (Shojaei, 2019).

### 2.3. Threat: Linguistic and Terminological Perspectives

*Threat* lexically denotes intimidation, frightening, and instilling fear (Dehkhoda, 1946; Ibn Manzūr, 1988). Its technical meaning aligns with the idea of creating fear or intimidation in various domains (Ashouri, 2017).

### 3. Forms of External and Internal Threats

External threats can manifest in military, economic, political, legal, social, and cultural forms (Danesh Pour, 2012). In recent decades, the military dimension—once common—has diminished globally due to factors like international pressure, high human casualties, and severe economic costs. Instead, newer threats now dominate: political and international pressure, economic sanctions, and cultural and social hostilities such as soft warfare, cyberattacks, psychological and media wars, among others (Shojaei, 2019; Tavakoli & Razmi, 2013).

Internal threats appear as political, security, economic, cultural, social, environmental, health-related, psychological warfare, and threats emerging from cyberspace (Ashouri, 2017).

### 4. Cultural and Social Threats

Undoubtedly, enemies have entered cultural and social domains through cognitive warfare, posing serious and dangerous risks to the foundations of Islamic society (Ja'fari, 2006; Nouri, 2006). God has enumerated the various threats of disbelievers in the Qur'an, warning Muslims of them. Some key forms include:

#### 4.1. Undermining Religious and Spiritual Figures

God says: *"No sign comes to them from the signs of their Lord except that they turn away from it. So they have denied the truth when it came to them, but soon will come to them the news of what they used to ridicule."* (Qur'an, al-An'ām 6:4–5). This shows how disbelievers rebel and deny divine blessings such as *wilāyah* (guardianship). Islamic scholarship underscores that the recognition of *wilāyah* is a shield against cultural and social threat-making (Majlisi, 1983).

#### 4.2. Denial of Divine Revelations

Throughout history, polytheists and disbelievers have persistently denied divine teachings and opposed the prophets. God states: *"If We had sent down to you a book on parchment, and they touched it with their hands, those who disbelieve would have said: This is nothing but clear sorcery."* (Qur'an, al-An'ām 6:7). Such denial of divine signs aligns with satanic methods, aiming to confuse and render people ignorant of divine instructions. These efforts are ultimately nullified by God's will (Ibn Idris al-Hilli, 2008).

#### 4.3. Breaking the Prestige of Prophets

Disbelievers and polytheists employed numerous schemes against the prophets, including killing, harassment, and various forms of mockery. The Qur'an says: *"Messengers before you were ridiculed, but those who scoffed at them were encompassed by what they used to ridicule."* (Qur'an, al-An'ām 6:10). God promises retribution to those who mock His messengers and turns their plots back upon them. Islamic jurisprudence emphasizes how such attempts have historically failed to stop the divine mission (Researchers, 2002).

#### 4.4. Undermining Leadership

In the years following the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and during the leadership of Imam Khomeini (may God have mercy upon him) and the Supreme Leader (may God protect him), the enemies of the Islamic Revolution have devoted their utmost efforts to discrediting the leadership of the Islamic Republic. From the *Monafeqin* (Mojahedin-e Khalq) to other opposition groups, as well as satellite networks and cyberspace platforms, all have worked to destroy the image of the Leader of the Islamic Republic in every possible way, spreading despair among the people and portraying the governance of the Islamic Republic as ineffective so as to pave the way for foreign aggression (Shojaei, 2019).

These elements represent a serious threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and it is necessary for all institutions and organizations to prepare to confront such threats. Passive defense can play a vital role in this field because this institution carries the fundamental mission of monitoring society and public opinion and forecasting possible threats (Tavakoli & Razmi, 2013).

#### 4.5. *Insults and Attacks on Sacred Figures*

Classical Islamic jurisprudence does not identify an independent criminal category explicitly titled “insult or offense against sanctities.” However, jurists have examined this by addressing specific cases such as *sabb al-nabi* (insulting the Prophet) (Khoei, 1989), *sabb al-mu'minīn* (insulting believers) (Hakim Tabataba'i, 1989), *īdhā'* (causing harm), *qadhf* (false accusation of immorality), within sections on purity, pilgrimage (Najafi, 1983), prohibited commercial practices (Ansari), and the penal categories found in *Hudūd Jāmi'* (Amili, 1989). Based on these rulings, insulting sacred matters is deemed prohibited (Musavi Khomeini, 1994).

In works on legal maxims, topics such as “the prohibition of insulting what is sacred in religion” (Musavi Bojnourdi, 1998) and “the prohibition of insulting religious symbols and the desirability of honoring them” (Hosseini Maraghi, 1997) are also addressed.

One key example is insulting and attacking the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). When disbelievers saw that mockery could not divert the Prophet from his mission and that Islam was expanding and winning hearts among polytheists and idolaters, they resorted to accusing him of sorcery and falsehood. The Qur'an states: “*And the disbelievers say, 'This is a sorcerer, a habitual liar'”* (Qur'an Sād 38:4) (Ja'fari, 2006). They also claimed that the Prophet's revelations were nothing but confused dreams or fabrications: “*They say, [these are] confused dreams. Rather, he invented it*” (Qur'an al-Anbiyā' 21:5). In addition, because the Prophet's words were eloquent and captivating, attracting many followers, the disbelievers called him a poet, claiming his words were deceitful but meaningless: “*Rather, he is a poet*” (Qur'an al-Anbiyā' 21:5). At other times, to neutralize the impact of his message, they accused him of madness: “*And they say, 'O you upon whom the message has been sent down, indeed you are mad'”* (Qur'an al-Hijr 15:6). These are among the many methods used by disbelievers in their opposition to the Prophet (Ja'fari, 2006).

#### 4.6. *Humiliation of the People*

Humiliation, mockery, fault-finding, taunting, and derision of believers are among the main features of hypocrisy. The Qur'an notes: “*The hypocrites are apprehensive lest a surah be revealed about them, informing them of what is in their hearts. Say, 'Mock as you wish; indeed, Allah will expose that which you fear'”* (Qur'an al-Tawbah 9:64). They even called the believers foolish (Qur'an al-Baqarah 2:13). Historical reports record how hypocrites in the Prophet's time would go to the mosque, listen to Muslims' conversations, and then mock their faith. On one occasion, while they whispered among themselves, the Prophet noticed and ordered their removal from the mosque (Abd al-Malik ibn, 1936).

Hypocrites also criticized those who contributed to the preparation of the Islamic army. They accused wealthy donors of hypocrisy and ridiculed the poor who offered modest contributions according to their means. During the 9th year after Hijra, when the Prophet (peace be upon him) called Muslims to prepare for the campaign of Tabuk against the Romans, believers responded generously. The hypocrites, disbelieving in God and His Messenger and wishing for the army's defeat, mocked these sacrifices. They derided poor contributors like Abū 'Aqīl, claiming that God had no need for such small offerings. The Qur'an exposed their malicious intentions and warned of severe punishment: “*Those who criticize the contributors among the believers concerning their charities and [criticize] the ones who find nothing [to spend] except their effort—so they ridicule them—Allah will ridicule them, and they will have a painful punishment*” (Qur'an al-Tawbah 9:79) (Sālihi Shāmī, 1993). The roots of such humiliation lie in hypocrisy, itself stemming from greed for wealth, fear of losing life and property, desire to harm Islam from within, and the ambition for power (Nouri, 2006).

#### 4.7. *Plots and Deception Against Military Forces*

Political power—defined as the capacity to influence the social domain—is a central issue in political science (Āqā Mahdavi, 2014). God Almighty says: “O you who have believed, remember the favor of Allah upon you when a people determined to extend their hands against you, but He withheld their hands from you; and fear Allah. And upon Allah let the believers rely.” (Qur’an al-Mā’idah 5:11). This verse reminds believers that enemies once sought to annihilate them, but God repelled their harm. Hence, believers must hold firmly to piety and trust in God to receive divine aid and protection.

#### 4.8. *Normalization of Sin and Crime*

The *breaking of the social repugnance of sin* occurs when the ugliness and blameworthiness of sinful acts disappear, rendering wrongdoing ordinary and socially acceptable (Shojaei, 2019). One of Islam’s greatest recommendations is to maintain social deterrents against sin so that its moral ugliness remains vivid and rejected by society. The erosion of this deterrent threatens the moral fabric of a religious community, as daily misconduct gradually turns into a norm and even a means to achieve personal aims.

An example appears in the Qur’an: “If you fear treachery from a people, throw [their treaty] back to them on equal terms. Indeed, Allah does not like traitors.” (Qur’an al-Anfāl 8:58). This verse shows that treachery and covenant-breaking are not only condemned but indicate moral corruption and dishonesty in social relations. It commands believers to act transparently and fairly when ending agreements, highlighting the importance of honesty and justice. Delayed disclosure of betrayal can cause greater harm, while prompt action protects the community’s moral integrity (Ashouri, 2017).

### 5. **Strategies to Mitigate Cultural and Social Threats (Cultural and Social Passive Defense)**

1. Efforts to further familiarize the younger generation with the rich Islamic–Iranian culture to immunize them against foreign cultural incursions; answering religious doubts and increasing spirituality and religious convictions—of course with subtlety and using appropriate methods and tools.
2. Vigilance by public officials, managers, and social role models—especially the clergy—in speech and behavior, maintaining their exemplary role, and avoiding luxury in their personal lives.
3. Implementing social justice and combating discrimination and injustice, while striving to reduce class gaps and inequality.
4. Poverty alleviation and efforts to provide relative welfare, particularly for vulnerable strata and deciles at risk.
5. Efforts to reduce the prevalence of addiction to various narcotics and resolute combat against drug traffickers.
6. Establishing necessary mechanisms to reduce different crimes, including theft, murder, suicide, embezzlement, bribery, rent-seeking, money laundering, and other moral vices.
7. Observing comprehensive justice toward ethnicities, tribes, and border residents, and addressing their affairs to reduce disputes, insecurity, and unrest.
8. Planning to reduce migration to major cities by distributing public facilities nationwide; population concentration brings numerous political, security, cultural, social, economic, and environmental problems, which are now evident in metropolises.
9. Planning and efforts to increase marriage rates, childbearing, and consequent population growth, and to reduce divorce—through financial support, creation of stable employment opportunities, provision of suitable and affordable housing, and strengthening and consolidating the family institution.

### 6. **The Jurisprudential Duties of the Islamic State in the Cultural and Social Affairs of the People According to the Statement of Imam ‘Alī (AS)**

Imam ‘Alī’s statement regarding “granting people a life free from pressure and discrimination” (Naqibi, 2014) clearly emphasizes the jurisprudential duties of the Islamic state in cultural and social matters. This statement reflects the government’s responsibility to ensure welfare and social justice for all segments of society. An Islamic state must, by establishing suitable

cultural infrastructures, prevent oppression and corruption and create conditions in which every individual can live comfortably without fear of social and economic pressures. In addition to highlighting the reduction of pressure and discrimination, this dictum underscores the importance of promoting a culture of equality and respect for human dignity. In reality, the state's duty here is not only to meet material needs but also to furnish a healthy and secure environment for cultural and social growth and flourishing—where justice, peaceful coexistence, and active public participation in decision-making are ensured. Thus, the jurisprudential responsibilities of the Islamic state amount to building a society in which all individuals realize their rights and, free from any pressure or discrimination, advance on the path of development and excellence.

## 7. Jurisprudential Foundations of the State's Responsibility to Implement Passive Defense Against Domestic Cultural and Social Threats

The state's responsibility to implement passive defense against domestic cultural and social threats can be grounded in jurisprudential bases as follows:

### 7.1. *The Principle of Social Justice*

The establishment of social justice in the Third Development Plan, as well as implementation of Article 29 of the Constitution, clearly emphasizes expanding social justice. Under Article 59 of the Fourth Plan, the government is obligated to ensure justice and social stability (Hāji Ali & Mohammad Taghizadeh, 2013). Jurists have provided varying definitions of *'adālah* (justice). One definition treats justice as a moral habitus or state that impels a person to observe legal rulings and abstain from prohibitions (Khoei, 1989). Another describes justice as an inner quality that inclines a person toward piety (Ansari; Rāghib Isfahānī, 1983). Yet another depicts justice as a firm, soul-based disposition that constantly urges one to practice piety and *muruwwa* (noble conduct). In the authors' view, justice may be impaired in three situations: committing a major sin, persistence in minor sins, and the loss of *muruwwa* (Amili, 1989; Farāhīdī, 1985; Ibn Fāris, 1979; Sāhib ibn 'Abbād, 1981).

Realizing social justice by establishing social balance, creating public tranquility, ensuring societal security, and preventing and diminishing social corruption are all policies the state attains through implementing passive defense. In this sense, the principle of social justice renders passive defense against domestic cultural and social threats a necessity.

### 7.2. *The Principle of Cooperation (Ta 'āwun)*

God Almighty says in Qur'an 5:2—known as the *verse of cooperation*: “Cooperate with one another in righteousness and piety, and do not cooperate in sin and aggression.” This verse grounds the principle of cooperation and the rule “the prohibition of aiding in sin and aggression,” such that, under its first clause, Muslims are obliged to assist one another in righteous deeds—a responsibility placed upon all believers (Musavi Bojnourdi, 1998).

Cooperation is a foundational pillar in Islam. Social participation in the Qur'an is not confined to almsgiving to the needy; as a comprehensive principle, it spans wide cultural and social dimensions. It emphasizes interaction and collaboration among members of society to realize common aims—the pursuit of public good and mutual assistance in facing life's challenges. Cooperation fosters closer, more affectionate relations among community members and leads to social cohesion.

Because this noble verse assigns a duty to each individual, the state—as the governing institution—stands among its direct addressees by extension; thus, the principle of cooperation constitutes another foundation for the state's duty to implement passive defense against domestic cultural and social threats.

### 7.3. *The Rule of Maslahat (Expediency/Public Interest)*

In English, *maslahat* corresponds to “expediency,” meaning what is fitting, appropriate, advantageous, or pragmatic. In Persian usage, it stands opposite to *mafsadah* (corruption) and signifies “rightness and propriety” (Dehkhoda, 1946). In jurisprudential terminology, *maslahat* denotes the preservation of the purposes of the Lawgiver and the protection of Islamic values (Feyz, 1994).



*Maslahat* may be used in a verbal-noun sense—acquiring benefits and repelling harms in general, i.e., realizing good and averting evil—or as a concrete noun, as the opposite of *mafsadah*, aligning with its lexical sense of good, rightness, suitability, and worthiness. The term is capacious and overlaps with concepts such as the absence of corruption, necessity, benefit, truth, rational good and evil, *istihsān*, *sadd al-dhara'i* and *fath al-dhara'i*, custom, the purposes of the Sharia, causation ('*illah*'), and wisdom (*hikmah*) (Ibn Manzūr, 1988; Shīrīnī, 1983). Today it is a familiar and widely applied concept in Islamic law and legal theory, debated within and across schools. As a rule, *maslahat* can serve both as a basis for substantive and governmental rulings and as a source for juristic inference and judicial application.

Applied to the state's duty to implement passive defense against domestic cultural and social threats, if such implementation fails, the social order tends toward decay and collapse and the people face serious difficulties. Therefore, significant public interest lies in the state's implementation of passive defense in these domains; accordingly, this rule underwrites the necessity of governmental implementation of passive defense against domestic cultural and social threats.

#### 7.4. The Rule of *Lā Ḍarar* (No-Harm Principle)

The *lā ḍarar* rule is among the well-established principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Its proof text is the Prophet's famous statement: "There is no harm and no reciprocating harm in religion/Islam" (Rashī Najafī). Fakhr al-Dīn is reported in *Īdāh al-Fawā'id* to have claimed the mass-transmission (tawātur) of reports on the negation of harm (Huseynī Rūhānī, 1992).

The rule means that, within Islamic law, no ruling should result in the infliction of harm; any ruling whose existence entails injury is inadmissible in Islam. In other words, it is a universal norm in Islamic legal thought that enacted rulings must not produce harm (Ja'fārī Tabrīzī). Hence, the principle signifies that no one may injure others by infringing upon their rights; the Lawgiver has not instituted any harmful rule. The rule indicates both the rejection of harmful rulings and the limitation of evidences to cases other than those that entail harm (Ansari). Examples include exempting the sick from the obligation to fast or avoiding compulsion to sell in cases of gross inequity (*ghabn*), among others (Huseynī Yazdī, 1981).

*Ḍarar* (harm) can be defined as a diminution in value (Kumpānī, 1995), which is negative and thus *ḍirār* (reciprocating harm) is proscribed. The result is the generality of the rule and the obligation to provide compensation when harm occurs (Musavi Khomeini, 1994). Negation of harmful rulings occurs in two ways: sometimes by negating the very reality and essence of harm, thereby rejecting a harmful ruling; and at other times by initially or implicitly negating a harmful ruling in specific contexts (Huseynī Yazdī, 1981).

Reason ('*aql*)—as a confirmer of the *lā ḍarar* rule—presents it as the most important juristic support for the principle of compensating all losses (Mohammadi, 1995). This rule is counted among the *mustaqlāt 'aqliyyah* (independent rational judgments) that intellect can establish without recourse to a textual command (Marāghī, 1996). Some jurists (Kātūziān, 2006) believe that, due to its rational nature, the rule is universal in scope, encompassing all instances of harm, so all losses are compensable. In the same vein, jurists hold that awarding damages to the injured party is both logical and just (Yazdāniān, 2007).

The core meaning of the *lā ḍarar* ḥadīth is to prevent every form of harm that may occur. Just as harmful rulings are prohibited by the Lawgiver, actual harms and incurred losses must also be prevented and remedied (Mar'ashī, 2006).

It follows that denying the necessity of the state's implementation of passive defense against domestic cultural and social threats would produce significant loss and harm. Such denial would ultimately injure the populace across all dimensions of life, since cultural and social threats do not remain confined to a narrow sphere; rather, they directly and indirectly affect other facets of social life, including the economy and beyond. On this reasoning—and based on the rule under discussion—the necessity of the state's responsibility to implement passive defense against domestic cultural and social threats is reinforced.

## 8. Conclusion

A fair and realistic assessment of the country's various sectors shows that, militarily and defensively, Iran holds an acceptable position and, in some areas—such as missile and drone capability—is competitive on a global level. Yet in other

fields, particularly culture, society, and the economy, there are significant deficiencies, shortcomings, and challenges. Issues such as inflation, declining religious commitment among the younger generation, addiction, deepening poverty and class divides, rising crime, decreasing population and marriage rates, growing divorce rates, and the devaluation of the national currency have reached the threshold of threat and produced widespread public dissatisfaction. These problems require urgent and appropriate solutions.

A large share of these difficulties stems from weaknesses and inefficiencies among managers and public officials; part is driven by external pressures, particularly cultural offensives and U.S.-led economic sanctions; and another part is due to restrictive or outdated laws and regulations. Therefore, effective and practical action is essential in three main areas.

First, in the field of laws and regulations, the state and the parliament must draft and enact new, forward-looking laws to replace outdated and obstructive ones.

Second, regarding external pressures, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must pursue active and constructive diplomacy to open economic channels and reduce sanctions, since many cultural and social issues originate from economic distress.

Third, in the selection and appointment of managers and officials, citizens must choose qualified, competent, dedicated, and honest individuals when electing the president, parliamentary representatives, and council members. Likewise, the president, in appointing ministers, and ministers, in selecting mid-level and local managers, must prioritize merit and expertise. Neglecting this responsibility and sacrificing meritocracy for connections, factionalism, or nepotism creates accountability before God, the people, and the state. Those responsible must answer for harm caused to the country and its citizens, provide restitution, and, where the law recognizes criminal misconduct, face punishment.

Overall, the principle of social justice, the principle of cooperation, the rule of expediency (*maslahat*), and the rule of no-harm (*lā ḍarar*) together establish the necessity of implementing passive defense against domestic cultural and social threats. Based on these foundations, the Islamic state must accurately identify cultural and social threats, eliminate vulnerabilities, and strengthen the nation's cultural and social fabric. By adopting preventive strategies and creating an environment that fosters creativity and cultural advancement, the government can block harmful and dangerous patterns from taking root.

In this regard, passive defense serves as a fundamental strategy to enhance society's resilience against internal threats. Central to this effort is cultivating social responsibility and encouraging active public participation in safeguarding national and religious cultural values. Therefore, the state must provide appropriate infrastructures and raise public awareness to guide society toward commitment and progress, ensuring that cultural and social threats cannot undermine its stability and cohesion.

## Ethical Considerations

All procedures performed in this study were under the ethical standards.

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## Conflict of Interest

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