Assessing the Impact of Artificial Intelligence–Related Laws on the Quality, Speed, and Transparency of Public Services under Iran's Fourteenth Administration

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Abstract

The growing integration of artificial intelligence into public administration has transformed the organization, delivery, and evaluation of public services. This article assesses the impact of artificial intelligence–related laws, policies, and institutional arrangements on the quality, speed, and transparency of public services under Iran's Fourteenth Administration. The study adopts a descriptive-analytical legal approach and draws on national policy documents, relevant legal principles, institutional developments, and scholarly literature concerning artificial intelligence governance and automated public-sector decision-making. The analysis distinguishes between normative, institutional, and operational impacts. The findings indicate that the legal and policy framework inherited and further developed by the Fourteenth Administration has strengthened the strategic legitimacy of artificial intelligence, promoted institutional coordination, supported technological infrastructure, and connected AI deployment with administrative reform. These developments have created important capacities for reducing repetitive procedures, improving information processing, accelerating routine services, and supporting more consistent administrative decisions. However, the practical effects of these measures remain insufficiently documented because comprehensive and independently verified data on processing times, accuracy, error rates, accessibility, complaints, and citizen satisfaction are not yet publicly available. The study further finds that Iran still lacks a comprehensive and risk-based legal framework governing high-impact public-sector AI systems. Major gaps remain in algorithmic impact assessment, personal-data protection, public registration of AI systems, meaningful explanation, human oversight, independent auditing, procurement accountability, incident reporting, and remedies for algorithmic harm. Accordingly, the existing framework has produced clearer normative direction and greater institutional capacity, but its measurable contribution to service quality, speed, and transparency cannot yet be conclusively established. The article concludes that Iran requires a multilayered regulatory model combining parliamentary legislation, executive regulation, technical standards, sector-specific rules, public performance reporting, independent supervision, procedural rights, and enforceable remedies.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence; Public Services; AI Regulation; Fourteenth Administration; Administrative Law; Service Quality; Service Speed; Transparency; Algorithmic Accountability; Smart Government

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1. Introduction

Artificial intelligence has begun to alter the meaning, organization, and legal character of public service delivery. Earlier stages of governmental digitalization primarily involved transferring paper-based procedures to electronic platforms, establishing online portals, and enabling citizens to submit applications or obtain information remotely. In those arrangements, the substantive administrative judgment generally remained with a human official, while technology facilitated communication, registration, storage, and transmission. Artificial intelligence introduces a qualitatively different transformation because it can participate in identifying beneficiaries, evaluating eligibility, detecting irregularities, prioritizing cases, forecasting demand, allocating resources, recommending administrative action, and, in some contexts, generating or executing decisions. The public-sector applications of artificial intelligence therefore extend beyond administrative convenience and may directly influence the legal position, opportunities, obligations, and access rights of citizens. Wirtz, Weyerer, and Geyer explain that artificial intelligence can support public authorities through automated analysis, prediction, pattern recognition, and decision support across multiple areas of administration (Wirtz et al., 2019). Henman similarly argues that the value of artificial intelligence in public services lies not merely in replacing manual tasks but also in reorganizing how governments understand problems, target interventions, and coordinate services (Henman, 2020). Consequently, AI-assisted public services must be examined not only as technological products but also as institutional arrangements through which public authority is exercised.

This transformation generates a central tension between administrative efficiency and public-law legitimacy. Artificial intelligence may shorten processing times, reduce repetitive work, improve the consistency of routine assessments, and enable public organizations to analyze volumes of data that exceed ordinary human capacities. At the same time, an automated or algorithmically supported decision may be difficult for the affected citizen to understand, challenge, or verify. Coglianese and Lehr demonstrate that machine-learning systems challenge conventional assumptions about administrative reasoning because their outputs may be generated through complex statistical relationships rather than an easily stated legal syllogism (Coglianese & Lehr, 2017). Zalnieriute, Moses, and Williams emphasize that the automation of government decision-making must remain subject to the rule of law, including legality, rationality, equality, procedural fairness, and reviewability (Zalnieriute et al., 2019). The relevant question is therefore not whether the government should pursue technological modernization, but how it can do so without weakening the legal safeguards that distinguish legitimate public administration from the unaccountable exercise of power. A fast decision cannot be considered a successful public service if it is based on inaccurate data, reproduces discrimination, conceals its reasoning, or deprives the citizen of an effective remedy.

The regulatory dimension is particularly important because public-sector artificial intelligence differs from many private applications. Citizens can sometimes refuse a private digital service, choose another provider, or withdraw from a commercial relationship. They often cannot avoid interacting with public institutions responsible for taxation, social protection, licensing, education, healthcare, municipal services, identity registration, employment regulation, and administrative justice. The imbalance of power is therefore greater, and the consequences of erroneous or opaque decisions may be more serious. Citron's concept of technological due process shows that automated government systems can weaken notice, reason-giving, individualized consideration, and meaningful opportunities to contest adverse decisions unless procedural protections are deliberately incorporated into system design (Citron, 2008). Cobbe further demonstrates that judicial review becomes difficult when the administration cannot provide sufficient information about the model, data, logic, institutional responsibility, and degree of human involvement behind an automated outcome (Cobbe, 2019). This means that AI regulation in the public sector must regulate not merely the final output but the complete administrative arrangement through which the system is designed, procured, trained, tested, deployed, monitored, updated, and withdrawn.

The Iranian legal system has increasingly recognized artificial intelligence as a matter of national governance and administrative reform. The policy trajectory developed before and during the Fourteenth Administration has included national strategic orientation, institutional design, attention to technological infrastructure, and the incorporation of AI-related objectives into broader plans for governmental modernization. Iranian scholarship has accordingly moved from general discussions of technological opportunity toward questions of regulation, institutional competence, public accountability, data governance, and the appropriate division of responsibilities among public bodies. Ghamami argues that the rationale for AI legislation arises from the scale of its potential effects on rights, markets, security, public power, and social relations (Ghamami, 2024). Ojaqi,

Soleimani Rouzbehani, and Zohourian Nadali examine AI norm-setting as a field requiring coordinated legal, regulatory, ethical, and technical instruments rather than reliance on a single legislative act (Ojaqi et al., 2024). Mahmoudi and Akbari likewise emphasize the importance of developing a national regulatory system capable of coordinating innovation, risk management, institutional responsibility, and public-interest protection (Mahmoudi & Akbari, 2024). These contributions indicate that Iran's current challenge is no longer simply whether to recognize artificial intelligence as a strategic technology; it is how to convert general recognition into legally enforceable rules governing public-sector applications.

The Fourteenth Administration occupies a decisive position in this transition. The preceding policy period largely placed artificial intelligence on the national agenda, articulated strategic ambitions, and established initial institutional expectations. The Fourteenth Administration inherited those foundations but has faced the more demanding tasks of implementation, institutional reconfiguration, interagency coordination, administrative integration, and the development of operational mechanisms. Its performance must therefore be assessed differently from that of a government engaged mainly in agenda setting. The relevant standard is not simply the number of documents adopted or institutions announced. It is whether the resulting framework has improved how citizens experience public services and whether administrative agencies can demonstrate measurable gains in accuracy, timeliness, accessibility, consistency, intelligibility, and accountability. Akbari identifies substantial capacities for artificial intelligence to improve the national administrative system, particularly by supporting evidence-based decisions, reducing repetitive procedures, coordinating data, and increasing the responsiveness of public organizations (Akbari, 2024). Babaeian and Akbari also explain that AI-supported analysis can improve public policymaking by enabling the processing of diverse information, identifying trends, evaluating alternatives, and anticipating policy consequences (Babaeian & Akbari, 2024). However, these capacities remain potential benefits unless legislation, institutional practice, technical infrastructure, and public reporting make them observable.

The objective of this article is to evaluate the impact of AI-related laws, policies, and regulatory arrangements on the quality, speed, and transparency of public services under Iran's Fourteenth Administration. The evaluation adopts a legal and institutional approach rather than claiming an empirical causal relationship unsupported by publicly available operational data. Quality is understood broadly to include accuracy, consistency, accessibility, responsiveness, fairness, security, and the capacity to correct errors. Speed refers not merely to computational processing but to the total time required for a citizen to obtain a lawful, usable, and final service, including the time spent resolving errors or appealing decisions. Transparency includes public knowledge of where AI is used, comprehensible notice to affected persons, traceability of decision processes, disclosure of institutional responsibility, access to reasons, publication of performance indicators, and the possibility of independent scrutiny. These dimensions are interdependent. A service may become faster but less reliable, more consistent but systematically biased, or more digitally accessible to some groups while excluding others. Effective evaluation must therefore avoid treating technological deployment as equivalent to public-service improvement.

A further methodological caution concerns the difference between normative impact and operational impact. Normative impact occurs when laws and policy documents recognize AI governance as a public responsibility, assign tasks to institutions, establish planning obligations, encourage investment, or articulate values such as fairness and transparency. Institutional impact occurs when responsible bodies, procedures, budgets, standards, oversight arrangements, and lines of accountability are actually established. Operational impact occurs when service delivery measurably improves in practice. Zuiderwijk, Chen, and Salem show that public-governance research frequently identifies potential benefits of AI but also reveals substantial gaps concerning implementation, institutional context, long-term effects, and citizen experience (Zuiderwijk et al., 2021). Kuziemski and Misuraca likewise demonstrate that automated public-sector decision-making must be evaluated in relation to the democratic and administrative settings in which it is embedded (Kuziemski & Misuraca, 2020). This distinction is essential for the Iranian case. The existing framework has clearly produced normative orientation and some institutional capacity, but public evidence remains insufficient to attribute nationwide improvements in service quality, processing speed, or transparency directly to AI-related regulation.

The central argument of this article is that the Fourteenth Administration's AI-related legal and policy arrangements have had a positive but primarily foundational effect on public services. They have strengthened the strategic legitimacy of AI deployment, connected artificial intelligence to administrative reform, encouraged infrastructure development, and increased attention to regulatory coordination. Nevertheless, the framework has not yet matured into a comprehensive system governing

high-risk public-sector AI. Major gaps remain in risk classification, algorithmic impact assessment, personal-data protection, public registration of systems, independent auditing, reason-giving, human review, procurement accountability, incident reporting, and compensation for algorithmic harm. Busuioc argues that accountable artificial intelligence requires identifiable actors who can be questioned, evaluated, and sanctioned rather than abstract commitments to responsible technology (Busuioc, 2021). Knowles and Richards add that public trust depends on the perceived legitimacy of the authority deploying AI and the institutional safeguards surrounding its use (Knowles & Richards, 2021). The current Iranian framework should thus be understood as an incomplete transition from developmental policy toward rights-based and performance-oriented regulation.

2. Conceptual and Legal Foundations of AI-Regulated Public Services

The legal analysis of AI-related public services begins with the recognition that artificial intelligence can perform several distinct roles within administration. It may function as a clerical tool that classifies correspondence, summarizes documents, answers routine questions, or schedules appointments. It may operate as a decision-support mechanism that recommends priorities, identifies possible fraud, predicts service demand, or assists officials in reviewing applications. It may also function as a partially or fully automated decision system that determines eligibility, calculates benefits, assigns risk scores, recommends sanctions, or generates administrative outcomes with limited human intervention. These roles create different levels of legal risk. A chatbot that provides general information does not normally carry the same implications as a system that influences access to social assistance, healthcare, employment, education, or public licenses. A defensible legal framework must therefore classify systems according to their effects rather than applying identical rules to every use of AI. Hashemi frames this problem as a balance between control and innovation, arguing that regulatory policy must protect public interests without unnecessarily obstructing beneficial technological development (Hashemi, 2024). A risk-based approach is suitable precisely because it permits lower-risk uses to develop under lighter requirements while subjecting rights-sensitive systems to stronger safeguards.

Quality in AI-mediated public services cannot be reduced to technical accuracy. Technical accuracy concerns the proportion of correct outputs generated under particular testing conditions, but public-service quality also depends on the appropriateness of the objective, the legality of the criteria, the representativeness of the data, the treatment of exceptional cases, accessibility for different social groups, and the availability of correction mechanisms. A system may achieve high aggregate accuracy while imposing disproportionate errors on a minority population. Buolamwini and Gebru's study of commercial gender-classification systems illustrates how apparently successful models can display substantial accuracy disparities across demographic groups (Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018). In public administration, such disparities may translate into unequal access, intensified scrutiny, delayed benefits, or erroneous adverse decisions. Quality therefore requires disaggregated performance assessment, testing against the characteristics of the actual population, documentation of known limitations, and institutional procedures for correcting both individual errors and systemic defects. It also requires the government to define in advance what counts as successful performance. A model should not be introduced merely because it is innovative; it should be shown to improve a legally legitimate service objective.

The speed of public service must similarly be evaluated as an end-to-end administrative outcome. Automation may reduce the time required to read documents, compare records, detect missing information, or process standard applications. It can support twenty-four-hour access and reduce dependence on office hours. Yet computational speed can be misleading when the system generates errors that require lengthy correction, directs citizens through inaccessible digital interfaces, or produces an adverse decision without intelligible reasons. Henman notes that AI can improve efficiency and responsiveness but warns that poorly governed systems may introduce new forms of exclusion and administrative harm (Henman, 2020). Wirtz, Weyerer, and Geyer identify organizational readiness, data quality, employee capacity, legal uncertainty, and citizen acceptance as major challenges affecting public-sector AI outcomes (Wirtz et al., 2019). A proper speed indicator should therefore measure the time from the citizen's initial request to the final lawful resolution, including any requests for supplementary information, corrections, human reviews, or appeals. A system that issues an instant but incorrect refusal may be less efficient than a slower process that produces a reliable result.

Transparency has several layers. Institutional transparency requires public disclosure of which agencies use AI, for what purpose, with what legal authority, and through which suppliers or technical arrangements. Operational transparency requires

documentation of data sources, system functions, performance indicators, error rates, human involvement, and monitoring procedures. Individual transparency requires notifying a person when AI has materially influenced a decision and providing an explanation appropriate to the consequences of that decision. Oversight transparency requires access for regulators, auditors, courts, and other competent bodies to the information needed to evaluate legality and performance. Kroll and colleagues argue that algorithmic accountability does not necessarily require complete disclosure of source code but does require mechanisms that permit meaningful evaluation of whether systems comply with legal and institutional standards (Kroll et al., 2017). Cobbe explains that administrative review depends on the ability to reconstruct how an automated decision was made and to identify whether unlawful considerations, defective data, or unreasonable processes affected the result (Cobbe, 2019). Transparency should therefore be understood as structured answerability rather than indiscriminate technical disclosure.

The rule of law requires every exercise of public authority to have a lawful basis, remain within institutional competence, pursue a legitimate purpose, and comply with substantive and procedural constraints. These principles apply whether a decision is taken directly by an official or mediated through an algorithm. An agency cannot avoid responsibility by describing an outcome as the product of software. Coglianese and Lehr emphasize that automated administration must remain attributable to the public authority that adopts and relies on the system (Coglianese & Lehr, 2017). Busuioc similarly argues that accountability gaps emerge when responsibility is dispersed among agencies, developers, vendors, data providers, technical staff, and nominal human supervisors (Busuioc, 2021). Legislation should therefore designate the public body as legally responsible for the system's use, even where private contractors supply technology. Contractual arrangements may distribute financial or technical obligations between the government and a vendor, but they should not deprive the citizen of a clear public respondent.

Procedural fairness is particularly significant when AI affects rights, benefits, sanctions, or access to essential services. At minimum, the citizen should receive notice that an automated system has materially contributed to the decision, understand the principal factors relevant to the outcome, have an opportunity to correct inaccurate data, and obtain review by a qualified human official with genuine authority to change the result. Citron argues that automated systems should incorporate due-process values into their architecture rather than treating procedural protection as a corrective measure applied only after harm occurs (Citron, 2008). Zalnieriute, Moses, and Williams maintain that reason-giving and reviewability are essential to preserving the rule of law in automated government (Zalnieriute et al., 2019). Human oversight must also be substantive. A formal requirement that a person approve an algorithmic recommendation is ineffective when the official lacks time, expertise, information, or institutional freedom to question the system. Meaningful human control requires training, access to relevant documentation, authority to depart from the recommendation, and an obligation to exercise independent judgment.

Data governance is the foundation of lawful and reliable public-sector AI. Artificial intelligence systems generally depend on large datasets that may include personal, behavioral, financial, medical, educational, geographic, or administrative information. Ansari emphasizes that data law must address the legal basis of collection, purpose limitation, access, correction, security, transfer, and institutional responsibility (Ansari, 2023). Bouzari likewise identifies privacy, ownership, liability, transparency, and the legal classification of AI-related activities as central challenges for the legal system (Bouzari, 2023). In public services, the citizen may have little practical ability to refuse data processing because providing information is often necessary to receive a benefit or comply with a legal duty. This makes purpose limitation and necessity especially important. Data collected for one administrative objective should not automatically be reused for unrelated profiling or risk scoring. Quality controls should also identify incomplete, outdated, duplicated, or unrepresentative information before it influences decisions.

The ethical principles associated with artificial intelligence provide important guidance but cannot replace enforceable legal obligations. Jobin, Ienca, and Vayena identify recurring global principles such as transparency, justice, fairness, non-maleficence, responsibility, privacy, and human autonomy (Jobin et al., 2019). The OECD recommends inclusive growth, human-centered values, transparency, robustness, security, safety, and accountability (Oecd, 2019). UNESCO places human dignity, human rights, diversity, environmental well-being, fairness, transparency, human oversight, awareness, and responsibility at the center of AI governance (Unesco, 2021). These principles are relevant to Iranian public administration because they identify the substantive values that legislation should operationalize. However, general statements that AI should

be fair or transparent do not tell an agency when an impact assessment is mandatory, what information must be disclosed, who may inspect a system, when deployment must be suspended, or how an injured citizen may obtain compensation. Effective regulation must translate principles into duties, procedures, institutional powers, and remedies.

A lifecycle model offers the most appropriate framework for this translation. Regulation should begin before procurement or development, when the public agency defines the problem and determines whether AI is necessary. The agency should identify the legal basis, affected population, potential alternatives, data requirements, expected benefits, foreseeable risks, and indicators of success. During procurement, contracts should guarantee access to documentation, audit rights, incident notification, data portability, security obligations, and sufficient information to explain decisions. During development and testing, the system should be assessed for accuracy, bias, robustness, privacy, cybersecurity, accessibility, and compatibility with administrative law. During deployment, affected persons should receive notice, and human-review channels should operate in practice. Continuous monitoring should detect performance deterioration, changes in data patterns, emerging discrimination, and security incidents. Taghizadeh and Kheradmandnia stress that generative AI introduces additional implementation challenges, including unreliable outputs, data risks, intellectual-property concerns, security vulnerabilities, and the need for organizational controls (Taghizadeh & Kheradmandnia, 2024). Lifecycle governance is therefore especially necessary where public employees use generative systems to draft correspondence, summarize cases, interpret documents, or communicate with citizens.

Public trust should be treated as an outcome of lawful institutional design rather than a publicity objective. Citizens do not need to believe that AI is infallible. They need credible assurance that the government knows where AI is being used, understands its limitations, monitors its effects, accepts responsibility for mistakes, and provides effective remedies. Knowles and Richards argue that trust in public AI is connected to the sanction and legitimacy of the authority deploying the system (Knowles & Richards, 2021). Kuziemski and Misuraca show that automated public decision-making can affect democratic values when institutional safeguards are weak or when technological systems redefine policy choices without sufficient scrutiny (Kuziemski & Misuraca, 2020). Trust is therefore strengthened by visible safeguards: public system registers, independent audits, accessible explanations, publication of performance indicators, incident disclosure, human appeal, and meaningful sanctions for noncompliance. A government that reports limitations and corrects failures may generate more sustainable trust than one that presents AI as a flawless solution.

These conceptual foundations provide the criteria for evaluating the Fourteenth Administration. The relevant inquiry is whether its legal and institutional arrangements have moved public-sector AI toward lawful purpose definition, risk differentiation, data quality, procedural fairness, human control, measurable performance, and enforceable responsibility. A purely developmental approach would focus primarily on infrastructure, domestic technological capacity, investment, and adoption. Those goals are important, but a public-law approach asks additional questions: Which systems may make or influence administrative decisions? Which uses are prohibited or restricted? What rights do affected citizens possess? What must agencies publish? Who audits vendors and government bodies? What evidence demonstrates improvement? How are errors corrected? Who pays for harm? The quality of AI regulation depends on whether it answers these questions before large-scale deployment makes institutional practices difficult to reverse.

3. AI-Related Legal and Institutional Developments under the Fourteenth Administration

The Fourteenth Administration inherited an AI governance environment that had already moved beyond complete regulatory absence but had not yet developed into a comprehensive legal regime. The earlier phase was characterized by strategic recognition, national agenda setting, preliminary institutional design, and efforts to define the role of artificial intelligence in scientific, economic, administrative, and governmental development. The significance of this inherited framework lies in its creation of legal and policy expectations. Artificial intelligence was no longer treated solely as a research subject or private technological market; it became associated with national planning, public-sector modernization, institutional coordination, and the improvement of governance. Mehraban, Yousefi, and Akbari emphasize that the development of AI and data-driven governance requires institutional mapping and a clear national division of labor (Mehraban et al., 2023). Without such mapping, overlapping mandates and fragmented initiatives may produce duplication, regulatory competition, and uncertainty

about responsibility. The Fourteenth Administration's starting point was therefore a partially constructed institutional field in which strategic ambition had advanced more rapidly than detailed legal safeguards.

The National Artificial Intelligence Document represented an important normative development because it articulated broad objectives, institutional expectations, and a national vision for AI development. Its relevance to public services arises from the connection between artificial intelligence, administrative capability, social justice, national coordination, public-sector efficiency, and the improvement of governance. Yet a national strategic document and a comprehensive statute perform different legal functions. A strategic document can orient institutions and authorize planning, while a statute can define rights, duties, prohibitions, enforcement powers, judicial standards, and remedies. Ojaqi and colleagues explain that AI governance requires a coherent doctrine of norm-setting in which laws, regulations, standards, ethical norms, and institutional practices are aligned (Ojaqi et al., 2024). Ghamami's analysis of the reasons for AI legislation likewise supports moving beyond general policy recognition toward binding legal rules proportionate to the risks created by AI systems (Ghamami, 2024). The Fourteenth Administration has therefore operated within a gap between national strategic direction and the absence of a detailed legislative framework for public-sector automated decision-making.

The institutional structure surrounding national AI governance has also been a central issue. The preceding arrangements contemplated high-level leadership and a specialized national organization, while subsequent developments under the Fourteenth Administration reflected a shift toward implementation, technological development, and the practical application of AI. This transition can be understood as an attempt to connect national policy with operational programs, infrastructure, and administrative use cases. Mahmoudi and Akbari's work on a national AI regulatory system underscores the need to distinguish among policymaking, technological development, service provision, standard setting, supervision, and enforcement (Mahmoudi & Akbari, 2024). If one institution simultaneously promotes AI adoption, funds projects, evaluates safety, defines standards, and determines whether failures occurred, conflicts of interest may arise. An innovation body is normally assessed by the speed and scale of adoption, whereas an independent regulator must sometimes delay, restrict, or prohibit deployment. Institutional design must therefore avoid combining developmental and supervisory mandates without adequate separation.

The Fourteenth Administration's administrative reform agenda provides the most direct pathway through which AI-related policy may influence public services. Artificial intelligence can support the identification of redundant procedures, automatic verification of information, demand forecasting, intelligent routing of requests, detection of administrative anomalies, and personalized communication with service users. Akbari describes AI as a means of enhancing the national administrative system through data analysis, process improvement, organizational learning, and more responsive decision-making (Akbari, 2024). Babaeian and Akbari similarly identify AI's capacity to strengthen the public-policy process by improving information analysis and evaluation (Babaeian & Akbari, 2024). Connecting AI policy to administrative reform is therefore a meaningful advance because it shifts attention from abstract technological leadership to concrete governmental functions. However, administrative integration also increases legal risk. Once AI becomes embedded in routine service processes, errors may affect large numbers of citizens, and informal technological practices may become normalized before adequate safeguards are adopted.

Infrastructure development is another important feature of the Fourteenth Administration's approach. Public-sector AI requires computing capacity, interoperable databases, secure networks, reliable digital identity, skilled personnel, procurement expertise, and mechanisms for sharing information across agencies. The regulatory focus on providers of AI-related services and the development of licensing principles may help establish minimum requirements for market entry, technical capacity, security, and service accountability. Hashemi's analysis suggests that legal policy should combine innovation incentives with safeguards responsive to the distinctive risks of AI (Hashemi, 2024). Nevertheless, provider licensing is only one layer of governance. A technically competent provider may still supply a system that is inappropriate for a particular public purpose, trained on unsuitable data, or deployed without procedural safeguards. Regulation must therefore address both the provider and the public authority using the system. The agency must remain responsible for defining the lawful objective, evaluating necessity, monitoring outcomes, explaining decisions, and providing remedies.

The legal status and institutional authority of high-level policy documents also require careful consideration. In Iran, resolutions adopted by bodies such as the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution may carry substantial policy and

administrative significance, but their relationship with parliamentary legislation, constitutional principles, governmental regulations, and judicial review can generate legal questions. Darvishvand, Fazaeli, and Esmaeili Givi examine the status of such resolutions in relation to the opinions of the Guardian Council, demonstrating that the position of these instruments within the legal hierarchy is not merely theoretical (Darvishvand et al., 2018). In AI governance, hierarchy matters because citizens, agencies, courts, vendors, and regulators must know which obligations are legally binding, which body may impose sanctions, and which rules prevail in the event of conflict. A national policy document may establish valuable goals but may not provide an adequate basis for restricting rights, processing sensitive data, imposing penalties, or limiting access to remedies. The Fourteenth Administration's regulatory development must therefore be supported by clear legislative authority.

The general Iranian legal system contains principles that can be applied to AI-mediated public services. Constitutional protections concerning equality, legal protection, privacy-related interests, access to justice, and prevention of harm can constrain public use of artificial intelligence. General administrative legislation supports public accountability, service quality, transparency, access to information, and the possibility of challenging governmental acts. Civil-liability rules may provide a basis for compensation in some circumstances, while electronic-transactions and cybercrime legislation regulate aspects of digital information and security. Ansari's analysis of data and AI law shows, however, that traditional legal categories do not automatically resolve the distinctive challenges created by automated systems (Ansari, 2023). Bouzari similarly notes that AI produces legal uncertainties concerning attribution, responsibility, privacy, ownership, and decision-making (Bouzari, 2023). Existing general principles are therefore necessary but insufficient. They provide normative foundations, yet they do not ordinarily require algorithmic impact assessments, system registers, model documentation, bias testing, incident reporting, or explanations tailored to automated decisions.

The absence of a comprehensive personal-data protection framework is one of the most consequential weaknesses affecting the Fourteenth Administration's ability to deploy AI lawfully. Public AI systems may combine information from multiple agencies, infer sensitive characteristics, identify patterns not apparent in individual records, and repurpose data collected for different administrative objectives. A fragmented approach to data protection makes it difficult to establish uniform rules concerning legal basis, necessity, proportionality, retention, correction, access, security, sharing, and independent supervision. The OECD's AI principles stress that AI systems should respect human-centered values and operate with robustness and accountability (Oecd, 2019). UNESCO likewise emphasizes privacy, data governance, fairness, transparency, and human oversight (Unesco, 2021). In the context of the Fourteenth Administration, the expansion of data-driven services without comprehensive data rights could increase processing capacity while leaving citizens uncertain about what information is used, how it is combined, and how inaccuracies can be corrected.

Another unresolved issue is the regulation of government procurement. Many public bodies lack the internal capacity to develop advanced AI systems and consequently depend on private contractors. Procurement contracts may contain confidentiality provisions, technical restrictions, or intellectual-property claims that limit administrative access to model documentation and prevent independent evaluation. Kroll and colleagues show that accountability can be achieved through carefully designed verification mechanisms even when systems involve proprietary technology (Kroll et al., 2017). Busuioc warns, however, that accountability may be diluted where public agencies rely on vendors yet cannot explain or control the technology they use (Busuioc, 2021). Under the Fourteenth Administration, procurement rules should require access to relevant documentation, auditability, incident reporting, data portability, cybersecurity duties, performance testing, and cooperation with administrative and judicial review. The government should not purchase systems that it is legally or technically unable to scrutinize.

Generative artificial intelligence creates additional institutional challenges. Public employees may use generative tools to draft administrative correspondence, summarize legal files, translate materials, answer citizen inquiries, prepare policy documents, or analyze complaints. These uses may improve productivity but can also introduce fabricated information, inconsistent reasoning, disclosure of confidential data, and uncertainty regarding authorship and responsibility. Taghizadeh and Kheradmandnia emphasize that the development and implementation of generative AI require controls addressing accuracy, security, data, infrastructure, expertise, and organizational readiness (Taghizadeh & Kheradmandnia, 2024). A public body should therefore not treat generative AI as an ordinary office application. Internal rules should determine which data may be entered, when outputs require verification, which tasks may not be delegated, how use is documented, and who remains

responsible for the final communication or decision. The legal effect of an administrative act cannot depend on an unverified generated text.

The Fourteenth Administration's framework can accordingly be characterized as a transition from strategic recognition toward implementation, but not yet as a completed system of AI administrative law. Positive developments include stronger integration of AI into administrative reform, attention to applied infrastructure, movement toward service-provider regulation, continued institutional coordination, and recognition of the need for national governance. The principal weakness is that implementation-oriented structures have advanced more visibly than citizen-oriented safeguards. The distinction between development and regulation remains insufficiently clear, detailed risk categories have not been fully embedded in public administration, and public reporting does not yet provide a comprehensive inventory of AI systems, their performance, or their effects. Henman cautions that AI can improve public services only when governance arrangements address institutional capacity, fairness, privacy, accountability, and public values (Henman, 2020). The Fourteenth Administration has thus created a basis for improvement, but its long-term legitimacy will depend on whether technological expansion is connected to enforceable rights and measurable service standards.

4. Assessment of the Effects on Quality, Speed, and Transparency

The effect of AI-related regulation on public-service quality under the Fourteenth Administration is positive in a foundational sense but not yet conclusively established at the operational level. The current framework has legitimized administrative attention to AI, encouraged planning, promoted infrastructure, and connected technological capacity to public-sector improvement. These measures can improve quality by enabling agencies to identify patterns in service demand, allocate resources more accurately, detect inconsistencies, reduce clerical errors, and provide more tailored responses. Akbari identifies the potential of AI to strengthen the administrative system through improved analysis, coordination, and responsiveness (Akbari, 2024). Zuiderwijk, Chen, and Salem also observe that AI may support public governance through prediction, automation, information processing, and more efficient interaction with citizens (Zuiderwijk et al., 2021). However, potential capacity is not equivalent to demonstrated quality. A credible evaluation requires published evidence concerning error rates, accuracy across population groups, service accessibility, complaint patterns, correction times, user satisfaction, cybersecurity incidents, and comparison with pre-AI procedures.

Quality may improve when AI increases consistency, but consistency is beneficial only when the underlying rule and data are lawful. An automated system can apply a criterion uniformly while the criterion itself is discriminatory, irrelevant, or based on an inaccurate proxy. Buolamwini and Gebru demonstrate that aggregate performance indicators can conceal unequal outcomes among demographic groups (Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018). This insight is directly relevant to Iranian public services because administrative datasets may reflect regional inequality, incomplete registration, differential access to digital services, historical patterns of enforcement, or errors concentrated among vulnerable groups. Before deploying a high-impact system, the responsible agency should test whether the data adequately represent the affected population and whether the model produces unequal false-positive or false-negative rates. Quality assessment should also examine linguistic accessibility, disability access, rural connectivity, and the capacity of citizens with limited digital literacy to use the service.

The legal framework can improve quality by requiring agencies to define the objective of an AI system before procurement. An agency should state which administrative problem the system addresses, why AI is more appropriate than a simpler method, what measurable improvement is expected, which groups may be affected, and what level of error is acceptable. Ghamami's rationale for AI legislation supports the use of law to prevent socially significant technological systems from developing without clear public-interest standards (Ghamami, 2024). Hashemi's regulatory analysis also indicates that innovation policy should be structured by legal requirements rather than guided solely by technological enthusiasm (Hashemi, 2024). If these requirements are absent, agencies may procure systems because AI is institutionally fashionable, because funding is available, or because vendors promise efficiency. The result may be expensive technological layering over poorly designed administrative processes.

The effect on speed is theoretically strong because AI can automate repetitive assessments, identify incomplete applications, retrieve relevant records, prioritize urgent cases, and support information exchange between agencies. A well-designed system

can reduce waiting times and eliminate repeated submission of documents already held by the government. Wirtz, Weyerer, and Geyer identify automation and increased efficiency as central public-sector applications of AI (Wirtz et al., 2019). Henman similarly recognizes the potential for more responsive and timely services (Henman, 2020). Under the Fourteenth Administration, the connection between AI and administrative reform may facilitate such improvements by encouraging process redesign rather than isolated technological projects. Nevertheless, there is insufficient publicly available comparative information to determine the extent to which processing times have actually fallen because of AI-related regulation. Announcing a digital or intelligent service does not establish that the entire administrative process has become faster.

Speed can deteriorate when automation is introduced into an unreformed process. If an agency retains unnecessary approvals, fragmented databases, conflicting forms, and unclear responsibilities, AI may merely add another technical layer. Citizens may receive rapid initial responses but encounter long delays when the system rejects an application incorrectly or when no official can explain the outcome. Coglianese and Lehr note that machine learning changes administrative decision structures and therefore requires institutional adaptation, not merely technological adoption (Coglianese & Lehr, 2017). Citron shows that automation can create procedural burdens when systems produce errors without accessible correction mechanisms (Citron, 2008). The proper measure of speed should include the time required to resolve exceptions, correct data, obtain human review, and enforce a final decision. It should also distinguish between ordinary cases and vulnerable users whose applications do not fit standard patterns.

AI-related regulation can influence transparency by requiring documentation and creating traceable digital records. Algorithmic systems can record when information was accessed, which variables were considered, what recommendation was generated, who reviewed the result, and whether the final decision departed from the recommendation. Such records may make administrative action more auditable than undocumented human discretion. Kroll and colleagues explain that appropriately designed systems can support accountability through verification and traceability mechanisms (Kroll et al., 2017). Busuioc similarly emphasizes that algorithmic accountability requires information capable of supporting institutional questioning and responsibility (Busuioc, 2021). The Fourteenth Administration's move toward structured AI governance could therefore strengthen transparency if agencies are required to preserve decision logs, publish system information, and provide access to competent oversight bodies.

At present, however, transparency remains one of the least developed dimensions. Citizens may not know which public bodies use AI, whether a system merely assists an official or determines an outcome, which data sources are involved, who developed the model, or where a complaint should be directed. Cobbe argues that automated public decisions challenge administrative-law review when their operation is hidden by technical complexity or institutional opacity (Cobbe, 2019). Zalnieriute, Moses, and Williams likewise stress that government automation must remain intelligible and reviewable under the rule of law (Zalnieriute et al., 2019). A national public register should therefore identify every material public-sector AI system, its purpose, responsible agency, provider, risk level, legal basis, deployment date, evaluation status, human-review arrangement, and complaint channel. Sensitive security information may be protected, but confidentiality should be narrowly justified rather than used as a general barrier to accountability.

Individual explanation is another essential component of transparency. An explanation need not reveal every mathematical parameter or line of source code. It should communicate the principal reasons for the decision in language appropriate to the citizen and identify the information that materially influenced the outcome. Knowles and Richards connect public trust to the legitimacy of the authority and the citizen's ability to understand the institutional basis of AI use (Knowles & Richards, 2021). Citron's technological due-process framework requires meaningful notice and an opportunity to challenge errors (Citron, 2008). For a high-impact public service, the notice should state that AI was used, describe its role, identify the responsible agency, summarize the decisive factors, explain how incorrect data can be corrected, and provide access to human reconsideration. A generic statement that "the system evaluated the application" is not an adequate explanation.

The relationship among quality, speed, and transparency is not necessarily harmonious. Stronger transparency procedures may initially require additional documentation and review, while intensive testing may delay deployment. Yet these safeguards can improve long-term efficiency by preventing mass errors, litigation, repeated complaints, and costly system replacement. Hashemi's distinction between control and innovation is useful because regulation should not be understood as the opposite of

technological development (Hashemi, 2024). Proper regulation can increase the reliability of innovation and reduce uncertainty for agencies and providers. Ojaqi and colleagues likewise support a coordinated system of norm-setting in which different regulatory instruments reinforce one another (Ojaqi et al., 2024). A service that is rapidly deployed but later suspended because of bias, security failure, or public opposition is not administratively efficient.

The most significant obstacle to evaluating the Fourteenth Administration is the absence of systematic public performance data. A national evaluation framework should require agencies to report the number and type of AI systems in use, processing-time changes, accuracy levels, error distribution, human overrides, complaints, successful appeals, security incidents, downtime, accessibility indicators, and corrective actions. Data should be published in aggregated form that protects personal information. Zuiderwijk, Chen, and Salem identify transparency, data governance, institutional capacity, and evaluation as major areas requiring further attention in AI-enabled governance (Zuiderwijk et al., 2021). Without standardized indicators, agencies may select favorable examples while omitting unsuccessful deployments. Independent evaluation is especially important because the institution promoting a system may have incentives to characterize it as effective.

The current framework also faces institutional fragmentation. Multiple bodies may participate in policy formulation, technological development, licensing, data governance, cybersecurity, administrative reform, and sector-specific supervision. Mehraban, Yousefi, and Akbari show why institutional mapping and a national division of labor are essential for AI governance (Mehraban et al., 2023). Mahmoudi and Akbari further emphasize the need for a coherent national regulatory system (Mahmoudi & Akbari, 2024). Fragmentation can reduce service quality by producing inconsistent standards, duplicative procurement, incompatible databases, and unclear responsibility. It can also weaken transparency because citizens may be redirected among agencies. A clearer model should separate strategic coordination, innovation support, sectoral implementation, independent supervision, and judicial review while requiring cooperation and information exchange.

A comprehensive risk-based statute would provide the strongest legal foundation for improving the three dimensions. It should distinguish low-risk administrative tools from systems that materially affect rights, access to essential services, legal status, employment, education, healthcare, welfare, taxation, licensing, policing, or adjudicative processes. High-risk systems should undergo a mandatory algorithmic impact assessment before procurement or deployment. The assessment should examine legal authority, necessity, alternatives, data quality, discrimination risks, privacy implications, security, explainability, human oversight, accessibility, and expected service benefits. UNESCO's framework supports impact assessment and human-rights-oriented governance (Unesco, 2021). The OECD's principles similarly emphasize transparency, robustness, safety, and accountability (Oecd, 2019). The assessment should not remain an internal formality; an appropriate public summary should be available before large-scale deployment.

Lifecycle auditing should complement impact assessment. Pre-deployment testing cannot anticipate every change in data, user behavior, institutional practice, or system performance. Models may deteriorate over time or produce new disparities when applied in different regions. Jobin, Ienca, and Vayena's review of global AI ethics guidelines demonstrates the broad importance assigned to fairness, transparency, responsibility, and non-maleficence (Jobin et al., 2019). These principles require ongoing monitoring in practice. High-risk public systems should be periodically examined by independent technical and legal evaluators. The regulator should possess authority to demand information, require corrective action, restrict use, suspend deployment, impose administrative sanctions, and disclose serious incidents. Audit results should include not only technical accuracy but also service outcomes and procedural fairness.

Procurement reform is equally necessary. Public contracts should guarantee government and regulator access to relevant documentation, training data descriptions, validation results, model updates, security information, and incident records. They should prohibit contractual terms that prevent lawful explanation or judicial review. Kroll and colleagues demonstrate that proprietary systems can still be subject to accountability mechanisms when institutional requirements are designed in advance (Kroll et al., 2017). Busuioc's accountability analysis indicates that agencies must not allow vendor relationships to obscure who is answerable for public decisions (Busuioc, 2021). Contracts should also address vendor lock-in by requiring data portability, interoperability, continuity planning, and the ability to transition to another provider. Public authorities should retain sufficient internal expertise to evaluate vendor claims rather than relying entirely on the supplier's own testing.

A final requirement is an accessible remedy system. The citizen should be able to identify the responsible agency, request correction of inaccurate data, obtain an explanation, seek human review, and appeal to an independent administrative or judicial body. Compensation rules should address harm caused by unlawful automated decisions, including cases where responsibility is distributed across agencies and contractors. Cobbe's analysis of judicial review underscores the importance of preserving effective legal scrutiny of automated public-sector action (Cobbe, 2019). Zalnieriute, Moses, and Williams show that automation should not weaken ordinary legal standards applicable to government (Zalnieriute et al., 2019). An effective remedy system would improve quality by correcting errors, improve transparency by requiring reasons, and improve speed by establishing clear review deadlines. It would also generate valuable feedback for system improvement.

The overall assessment is therefore conditional. AI-related laws and institutional measures under the Fourteenth Administration have created a stronger basis for modernization and have increased the likelihood that public agencies will use AI to improve services. Their positive effects are most visible in strategic direction, institutional attention, infrastructural support, and the integration of artificial intelligence with administrative reform. Yet there is not enough independent operational evidence to conclude that the framework has already produced general and measurable improvements in quality, speed, and transparency across public administration. The decisive next step is to connect developmental policy with a multilayered legal system composed of legislation, executive regulations, technical standards, impact assessment, public registration, independent supervision, procedural rights, procurement rules, performance reporting, and enforceable remedies.

5. Conclusion

The use of artificial intelligence in public services represents a transformation in the exercise of administrative authority rather than a simple continuation of electronic government. AI systems can organize information, predict needs, detect patterns, prioritize cases, recommend outcomes, and influence decisions that determine citizens' access to rights, benefits, licenses, opportunities, and essential services. Their value lies in their capacity to process information rapidly and consistently, but those same features allow errors, biases, and unlawful assumptions to be reproduced at an unprecedented scale. The legal assessment of public-sector AI must therefore examine not only technological performance but also the legitimacy of the objective, quality of the data, fairness of the process, comprehensibility of the decision, allocation of responsibility, and availability of effective remedies.

The Fourteenth Administration inherited an important but incomplete policy foundation. Artificial intelligence had already entered the national strategic agenda, and initial institutional structures had been proposed to coordinate its development. The distinctive responsibility of the Fourteenth Administration has been to transform those general commitments into operational administrative arrangements. Its efforts to connect AI with administrative reform, applied technological development, infrastructure, and provider regulation represent a meaningful transition from agenda setting toward implementation. This transition has created opportunities for public bodies to reduce repetitive procedures, coordinate information, forecast service needs, improve routine decision support, and develop more responsive channels of interaction with citizens.

The impact of these measures on public-service quality is potentially significant. Artificial intelligence can reduce clerical mistakes, identify inconsistencies, support evidence-based resource allocation, and facilitate more uniform treatment of similar cases. It may also allow agencies to identify service failures that are difficult to detect through conventional administrative methods. Nevertheless, quality cannot be inferred from deployment alone. It must be demonstrated through reliable and publicly available evidence concerning accuracy, error rates, accessibility, user satisfaction, security, equal treatment, successful correction of mistakes, and performance among different population groups. A system that performs well for the majority but systematically disadvantages a particular region, language group, disability group, or economically vulnerable population cannot be described as a high-quality public service.

The effect on speed is similarly conditional. AI can shorten internal processing, automate verification, detect missing documentation, and reduce unnecessary repetition. Yet genuine administrative speed must be measured from the citizen's initial request to the final lawful resolution. An immediate automated refusal followed by weeks of unsuccessful attempts to obtain a human explanation is not an efficient service. The government should therefore distinguish computational speed from procedural timeliness. Evaluation should include the time needed to correct data, obtain human reconsideration, resolve

complaints, and enforce final outcomes. Process redesign should precede or accompany automation so that technology eliminates unnecessary stages rather than accelerating a defective bureaucracy.

Transparency is the area in which stronger legal development is most urgently needed. Citizens should know when artificial intelligence is used, what function it performs, which public body is responsible, which categories of information materially affect the result, and how the decision can be challenged. Public transparency also requires a national inventory of AI systems used by government agencies, together with information about their purpose, risk level, provider, evaluation status, human-control arrangements, and complaint mechanism. Transparency does not require unrestricted disclosure of sensitive technical or security information. It requires sufficient information for citizens, regulators, auditors, and courts to examine whether public power has been exercised lawfully and fairly.

The Fourteenth Administration's existing framework has had its clearest effects at the normative and institutional levels. It has reinforced the legitimacy of AI as a matter of national governance, encouraged administrative planning, supported infrastructure, and increased attention to regulatory coordination. These effects are valuable because sustained public-sector reform requires strategic direction and institutional capacity. However, they do not yet establish a direct causal relationship between regulation and measurable nationwide improvements in service delivery. Public reporting remains too limited to support broad empirical claims, and the absence of standardized indicators prevents meaningful comparison among agencies and over time.

The central legal weakness is the lack of a comprehensive and risk-based framework specifically governing AI in public administration. General constitutional, administrative, civil, information-access, electronic-transactions, and cybersecurity rules provide important foundations, but they do not fully address the distinctive characteristics of algorithmic systems. They do not systematically classify high-risk uses, require algorithmic impact assessments, establish a national public register, define standards for meaningful explanation, regulate human oversight, mandate independent auditing, or clarify the allocation of responsibility between agencies and private suppliers. The absence of comprehensive personal-data protection further limits the ability to ensure lawful and proportionate use of the information on which AI systems depend.

A suitable legal model should be multilayered. Parliamentary legislation should establish fundamental rights, prohibited practices, risk categories, institutional powers, responsibility, sanctions, and remedies. Executive regulations should translate those rules into operational procedures for public bodies. Technical standards should address data quality, testing, security, robustness, documentation, interoperability, and accessibility. Sector-specific rules should adapt general requirements to healthcare, education, taxation, welfare, municipal administration, licensing, and other sensitive fields. Procurement rules should guarantee audit access, documentation, incident reporting, data portability, and freedom from vendor lock-in. Independent oversight should verify compliance and possess authority to suspend unsafe or unlawful systems.

Algorithmic impact assessment should become mandatory before a public body purchases or deploys a high-risk system. The assessment should determine whether the use of AI is legally authorized, necessary, proportionate, technically reliable, and superior to less intrusive alternatives. It should identify affected groups, data sources, possible discriminatory effects, privacy risks, cybersecurity threats, accessibility barriers, human-review procedures, and measurable service objectives. A public summary should be disclosed unless a narrowly defined legal exception applies. The assessment should be repeated when the system, data, purpose, or operating environment changes materially.

Meaningful human oversight should also be defined in substantive terms. Human involvement should not consist of routine approval of an algorithmic recommendation. The responsible official should understand the system's role, have access to the relevant information, possess authority to depart from its output, and be required to examine exceptional circumstances. High-impact adverse decisions should remain subject to review by a qualified person who was not merely implementing the original recommendation. Citizens should be able to correct inaccurate data, submit relevant information, receive reasons, and obtain reconsideration within a defined period.

Independent auditing and public performance reporting would make it possible to determine whether AI-related regulation actually improves services. Agencies should publish aggregated information on processing times, accuracy, error distribution, complaints, successful appeals, human overrides, security incidents, accessibility, and corrective measures. Indicators should be comparable across time and, where appropriate, across agencies. Independent evaluators should test systems for accuracy, bias, robustness, privacy, security, and compliance with administrative law. The supervisory body should be able to require modification, restrict use, suspend deployment, impose sanctions, and disclose serious failures.

Institutional responsibilities must be clarified to avoid conflicts between development and supervision. Bodies charged with promoting innovation and expanding adoption should not exercise exclusive control over the evaluation of legality and harm. Strategic coordination, technological development, sectoral deployment, independent regulation, and judicial review should remain connected but institutionally distinguishable. Public agencies must retain legal responsibility for decisions made through systems they procure from private providers. Contractual outsourcing should not create an accountability gap or prevent the government from explaining, auditing, correcting, or defending its decisions.

The overall judgment is that the Fourteenth Administration has advanced Iran from the stage of national AI recognition toward the more difficult stage of administrative implementation. This movement has created a credible foundation for improving quality, speed, and transparency, but the benefits remain contingent on the development of enforceable safeguards and measurable standards. At present, the framework should be described as capacity-building rather than outcome-proving. Its future success will depend on whether the government can establish a rights-based, risk-sensitive, transparent, and independently supervised system before high-impact AI applications become deeply embedded in public administration.

The ultimate purpose of AI regulation should not be to slow innovation or preserve inefficient administrative practices. It should ensure that innovation produces lawful and durable public value. Artificial intelligence should reduce the burden of dealing with government, not make administrative power more obscure. It should improve consistency without eliminating individualized justice, accelerate services without accelerating error, and expand data use without weakening privacy or autonomy. When citizens can understand how systems affect them, correct inaccurate information, obtain human review, and hold identifiable institutions accountable, technological modernization can strengthen rather than undermine public trust. The Fourteenth Administration's most important task is therefore to convert strategic ambition into a legal architecture in which efficiency, transparency, equality, and procedural justice operate as mutually reinforcing elements of intelligent government.

Ethical Considerations

All procedures performed in this study were under the ethical standards.

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Conflict of Interest

The authors report no conflict of interest.

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