

Appropriate Working Conditions in the Light of Human Dignity

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Abstract

In contemporary legal literature, rights categorized as human labor rights are gaining increasing significance. However, there are also objections, primarily based on the foundations of such rights, to classifying these rights as human rights. The approach of the present article is grounded in the premise that workers possess human dignity by virtue of being human and, therefore, should enjoy certain rights in the workplace or in relation to work that either stem from or protect their human dignity. Accordingly, labor-related rights are inseparably linked to human rights, as both originate from human dignity.

Keywords: human dignity, human rights, labor-related rights, intrinsic human value, autonomy, appropriate working conditions

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1. Introduction

The implication of human dignity is respect for one's intrinsic value and autonomy. As Kant expressed, a person with dignity must be respected and treated as an end in themselves, not merely as a means, and their autonomy must be acknowledged such that they themselves, through their free will, are the lawgiver of the rules governing their destiny—not others (Kant, 1991). However, when examining the transformations brought about by the industrialization of societies and the increasing growth of the free economy, as vividly portrayed by Charlie Chaplin in the film *Modern Times*, what is most evident is the transformation of the human being into a tool, caught between the gears of the free economy and industrial society in pursuit of livelihood. In fact, labor—which from Hegel's perspective differentiates humans from animals and, through its conscious application and absence of immediate necessity, serves as a medium for the assertion and elevation of human self-awareness—was, in Marx's view, alienated from its product due to the unjust distribution of the fruits and means of production. As a result, workers were compelled to meet their physical needs by selling their labor, in other words, working to survive. In this exchange, the compensation for labor was no longer the product itself but rather the money received in return (Sayers, 2003).

From a legal perspective, this kind of relationship may be conceived within the framework of a private contract between employer and employee. The principle of freedom of contract is typically deemed self-evident and governs the relationship. Therefore, since the relationship is based on a contract—or more precisely, mutual consent—it is legally valid and distinguishable from slavery, even appearing more humane. However, legal developments in labor relations, particularly the necessity of state interventions in support of the worker, have invalidated such simplistic assumptions (Wending, 2009). These

developments have narrowed the scope of contractual freedom. What matters above all is that in a labor relationship, being a worker is a human condition, and the individual enters this relationship with all their inherent and circumstantial attributes. Hence, their humanity and, accordingly, their human dignity must be respected and protected. This article, after examining the evolution and objectives of labor law and its human rights foundations and implications, seeks to clarify labor rights in light of the human dignity of workers.

2. Labor Law and Labor Relationship

The labor relationship, or in other words, working for others, has a long history. However, the legal protection of workers, which specifically pertains to labor law, is a relatively recent development. Clearly, when referring to working for others, first, it does not encompass self-employment or forms of labor performed under service contracts; rather, it exclusively concerns the employer-employee relationship. Second, slavery, despite involving forced labor for a master or owner, is not included, since it is characterized by ownership of one party over another—a legally obsolete condition. Hence, the concept of labor does not cover such relations and is not the subject of the current discussion. Nonetheless, new forms of slavery disguised within legitimate employment relationships must not be overlooked.

2.1. Legal Developments in the Labor Relationship and the Emergence of Labor Law

In legal terms, the labor relationship is manifested through a contract. However, the label and nature of that contract have not always been consistent. In Roman law during the era of slavery, just as a master could rent out a slave as a property or object, free persons could also rent out themselves, thereby working for others in exchange for compensation. Under the feudal system, influenced by Christian thought that human beings are created in the image of God, the labor relationship became more personal, and labor was identified with the worker and their unique skills. Nonetheless, in pre-revolutionary France, some jurists considered labor as a rentable object and referred to the lease of services. Following the French Revolution and the emergence of liberal ideologies and individualistic values, freedom of contract became one of the expressions of those values. The labor relationship was reflected accordingly in the 1804 French Civil Code under the category of lease of services. Thus, labor could be leased similarly to objects, with wages paid in return. This view of labor relations, shaped by the principle of autonomy of the will and freedom of contract, particularly given that the Industrial Revolution had occurred earlier in England than in France, suggests that such regulations were still situated in the era of feudal and master-apprentice relationships. Consequently, after the transformations brought by the Industrial Revolution—especially the radical shifts in labor relations and the creation of large factories equipped with automated machinery—the principle of freedom of will began to reveal its limitations in the labor relationship.

Child labor, working hours exceeding 13 hours per day, and unsafe, unhygienic work environments necessitated state intervention and the enactment of more protective legislation. The first such laws emerged in England, focusing on the protection of children and women. The 1802 Act prohibited factory apprentices from working more than 12 hours per day and banned night work. Subsequent laws in 1819 and the Factory Acts of 1833, 1844, 1847, 1850, and 1853 provided increased protections, particularly for women and children. In France, the first labor protection law was enacted in 1841, prohibiting the employment of children under eight years old, reducing their working hours, and banning night work for them.

It is important to note that labor movements, especially under the influence of socialist ideologies and through protests and strikes, played a significant role in prompting state intervention to pass protective laws. The formation of national labor unions in England (1834) and Germany (1863), and subsequently the First International Workingmen's Association under Karl Marx's efforts in 1864, significantly pressured governments to adopt and amend labor laws. These developments led to the recognition of collective labor relations, collective bargaining agreements, and syndicalism in legal systems. One notable example is France's March 21, 1884 Law on Trade Union Freedom, which enabled the collective power of workers to counterbalance employer dominance. These efforts and transformations first led to the emergence of an independent branch of law—labor law—in Germany, and later in England, the United States, France, and other countries, each with its own foundations, goals, and instruments.

2.2. *Characteristics and Objectives of Labor Law*

Given that labor law emerged during the industrial transformations and the rise of capitalism in industrialized nations, along with concurrent labor movements and socialist thought, its subject matter and primary objective are predictable. However, what may be less intuitive for legal scholars is the set of diverse foundations and instruments employed in labor law, which, despite being essentially a contractual relationship between worker and employer, exhibit specific features. These include limited contractual freedom in individual labor relationships, a unique understanding of the nature of labor, state intervention and oversight, and the application of special regulations. The reason for these distinctions may lie in several assumptions: first, that there is significant injustice inherent in labor relationships; second, that there is unequal bargaining power; third, that there is a high likelihood of abuse of authority; and fourth, that there is substantial social conflict. Based on these assumptions, three categories of regulations typically appear in labor law: (1) protective regulations, (2) distributive regulations, and (3) prescriptive regulations. Protective regulations primarily impose restrictions on labor contracts, such as child labor limitations, working hours, and occupational health and safety standards (Hyde et al., 2006; McCurdy, 1998). Distributive regulations include provisions such as minimum wage laws and social security rules. Prescriptive regulations facilitate collective action by workers, including collective bargaining, collective labor agreements, and conciliation mechanisms.

3. **Human Rights Foundations of Labor Law**

Simultaneous with the formation of labor law—particularly through labor struggles and movements, the drafting of labor-related legislation, and consequently the announcement of increased protections for workers both individually and collectively—certain international and regional human rights instruments, as well as the resolutions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and some national constitutions, have referenced rights related to labor. These rights, on one hand, were framed in labor law as entitlements or standards, and on the other, did not fully align with the concept of rights in the liberal tradition. Nevertheless, they were so influential and impactful that they gave rise to a new discourse under the title of "labor-related rights," which could be endowed with a human rights dimension (McCurdy, 1998).

Labor-related rights are claims or entitlements specifically connected to being a worker and may be exercised individually or collectively. They generally include rights such as the right to freely choose one's occupation, the right to enjoy appropriate working conditions—which may encompass elements such as fair wages or privacy—the right to protection against arbitrary or unjust dismissal, the right to union membership or representation, and the right to strike (Mantouvalou, 2012).

This approach to labor law, particularly the characterization of labor-related rights as human rights, has not been without opposition. A number of labor law scholars oppose this framework, primarily on the grounds that it eliminates class-based responses to neoliberal globalization by depoliticizing the labor movement. This perspective is based on the argument that a human rights approach to labor-related rights overlooks or nullifies the material scope of collective worker action and the fundamental role of economic conflict in labor relations, as it assumes that workers' power derives from their rights, whereas history testifies to the contrary. In line with this view, it has also been argued that the system of collective bargaining cannot be replaced with an individualistic conception of rights (Savage, 2008).

The most significant critique of labeling labor-related rights as human rights is raised by Collins, who challenges this notion based on the intrinsic characteristics of human rights. According to Collins, the modern idea of human rights—grounded in natural rights—presumes that all individuals, by virtue of being human, possess rights that are universal, imperative, and carry a special moral weight that overrides other considerations, and that the state must always respect them. He presents four reasons why labor-related rights cannot be considered human rights (Collins, 2011):

First, labor-related rights, unlike human rights, are not morally imperative claims. For instance, the prohibition of torture is a necessary and morally weighty right, whereas the right to fair wages or paid holidays lacks such moral urgency.

Second, labor-related rights, unlike human rights, are not universally applicable. They pertain only to those who are employed or have an employment-type relationship in exchange for remuneration.

Third, labor-related rights do not contain absolute and precise standards. For example, fair wages or paid holidays are largely contingent upon the economic capacity of a society, whereas human rights require the observance of minimum standards below which no state is permitted to fall (Mundlak et al., 2001).

Fourth, labor-related rights evolve over time and are shaped by production systems, labor structures, and the division of labor, whereas human rights are not constrained by historical context.

Given the above, a fundamental question arises: can labor-related rights be considered human rights? If so, which rights qualify, and what is the scope of their application? The following section seeks to clarify this issue in light of human rights instruments and the approach of the International Labour Organization.

3.1. *Labor-Related Rights and Human Rights*

It appears that some labor-related rights are, by their nature, indistinguishable from human rights and can thus be classified as such. But if such rights exist, which ones qualify, and how do they differ from other labor law entitlements and benefits?

In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), alongside other rights and freedoms, certain provisions explicitly concern labor. Article 23 of the UDHR states (Collins, 2011):

1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work, and to protection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for themselves and their family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of their interests.

Article 24 further states that "Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay." The ICESCR, in greater detail in its third part, addresses labor rights. For instance, Article 6(1) recognizes the right to work and the freedom to choose one's occupation as a means of securing a livelihood. Article 7 emphasizes the right of everyone to just and favorable working conditions, including fair and equal remuneration, adequate benefits for oneself and one's family, safe and healthy working conditions, equal opportunities for promotion without discrimination, and rest, leisure, reasonable limitation of working hours, and remuneration for public holidays (Collins, 2011).

Article 8 refers to trade union freedoms and recognizes the right to strike. Article 9 affirms the right to social security, and Article 10 highlights the right of working mothers to paid maternity leave or equivalent social security benefits during pre- and postnatal periods. Similarly, regional human rights instruments also mention labor rights, the most prominent of which is the 1996 European Social Charter, which—similar to the ICESCR but more comprehensive—enumerates labor-related rights.

Unlike the UDHR's approach of listing all rights and freedoms collectively, later human rights conventions, particularly influenced by the role of communist countries in their drafting, divided human rights into two categories: civil and political rights, and economic, social, and cultural rights. Generally, it is said that the first category includes negative rights and freedoms, while the second comprises positive rights and freedoms that require proactive state measures.

Thus, as seen in various conventions, labor-related rights are predominantly categorized under economic and social rights. From a positivist perspective, like that of some jurists, one might easily find answers to the above question in these documents and domestic laws and declare labor-related rights to be human rights. Additionally, certain ILO instruments—especially the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which identifies four fundamental rights: freedom of association and collective bargaining, elimination of forced or compulsory labor, abolition of child labor, and elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation—explicitly link these labor rights to human rights, thereby reinforcing their status.

However, a noteworthy observation is that while human rights documents have presented a wide range of labor-related rights as human rights, they have largely classified them under economic and social rights. Yet, some of these rights—such as trade union freedoms—are arguably first-generation rights. Moreover, the 1998 ILO Declaration, as critics have pointed out, recognizes only a limited set of rights as fundamental, and such a stance could lead to other essential labor rights being treated as secondary and less significant.

As mentioned, most labor-related rights in human rights documents fall under economic and social rights, which at times raises doubts about their inherent nature and enforceability. Nonetheless, echoing the position of the United Nations—which considers both civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights to be equal and indivisible—and in line with

Jeremy Waldron, who views the two categories as two sides of the same coin, one may insist on the artificial and political nature of this dichotomy and affirm that economic and social rights are just as important as civil and political rights. Human dignity and personal autonomy require access to these rights. Ethically, how can issues such as death, disease, malnutrition, and economic destitution be considered less significant than the violation of civil and political rights and be disregarded?

3.2. *Implications of Labor-Related Rights*

As is evident from the preceding discussions, certain labor-related rights are considered part of human rights, and workers, whether individually or collectively, are regarded as rights-holders vis-à-vis the state, employers, or other entities. Recognizing specific labor-related rights as human rights imparts to them particular weight and importance, thereby obligating states, on a global scale, to adopt supportive and appropriate measures.

Firstly, states are obliged—both internationally and domestically—to recognize and protect such rights through the enactment of relevant laws and regulations (Drzewicki, 2001).

Secondly, in cases of conflict between labor-related rights and economic considerations regarding production and productivity—a recurring issue in labor law—recognizing labor rights as human rights, particularly in light of the principle of human dignity, grants these rights a dominant and non-derogable status. This renders violations of certain fundamental human rights of workers unjustifiable. This is the approach adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in its 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, although, as previously mentioned, the recognized examples of fundamental rights are severely limited and subject to criticism (Alston, 2004; Waldron, 1993).

Thirdly, classifying labor-related rights as human rights confers universality upon them and ensures protection for all individuals, irrespective of citizenship or nationality—especially regarding fundamental rights derived from human dignity.

Fourthly, the recognition of labor rights as human rights softens the nature of employment contracts, which are often adhesionary and coercive, and renders clauses and conditions that violate such rights null and void.

4. **Human Dignity in Labor**

As discussed earlier, the industrialization of societies and the growth of capitalism have been the primary causes behind the emergence of labor law and its specialized protections for workers. The role and objective of labor law in this inherently unequal relationship is to strike a balance—through specific instruments—between the conflict of interest between workers on one hand and the exigencies of capital, including productivity, on the other. It is thus natural for states to consider not only the protection of workers but also broader social development and the economic implications of their labor law policies. Nevertheless, economic considerations should not be overly influenced by economic theories that present productivity and economic progress as inherently at odds with labor rights—views which have historically led states to adopt overly reactive and exaggerated economic policies focused on issues such as inflation or recession (Deakin & Wilkinson, 1994).

However, what matters most in the labor relationship is the issue of human dignity. Being a worker is a characteristic of a human being who, with their full personality and humanity, performs labor for another. Therefore, their human dignity necessitates conditions, facilities, and actions that recognize and respect their humanity. It is in light of human dignity that fundamental human labor rights become manifest and gain solid grounding. In other words, human labor rights are those that stem from the demands of human dignity; if a labor-related human right exists, it must be justifiable on the basis of human dignity.

4.1. *Legal Steps*

One of the main criticisms of the industrial transformation of labor was the critique posed by Marx. From Marx's perspective, the exploitation of workers by capitalists and the alienation of the products of their labor led to self-alienation and, consequently, to the violation of their humanity, as capitalists own the means of production and consider labor as a mere component of the production process. In such a framework, workers are forced to sell their labor to survive, receiving wages that do not reflect the true value of the products they create (Wending, 2009).

This Marxist critique was not unfounded, particularly in the post-industrial revolution context where workers were treated as mere elements of production and paid meager wages under the worst working conditions—regardless of whether they were children, women, or men. Workers were treated as tools serving the interests of employers, and thus the Kantian notion of treating humans as ends in themselves lost all meaning. Émile Durkheim referred to this state as “anomie” and believed that such a growing moral decay in human nature could not be ignored (Durkheim, 1964).

As a result of these developments and criticisms, both nationally and internationally, efforts were made to humanize labor relations and improve working conditions—efforts that were previously mentioned. However, the most significant initiative was the establishment of an international organization for regulating international labor standards, which was realized after World War I through the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. In Article 427 of the treaty, it was declared as a fundamental principle that “labor is not a commodity.” This principle, which forms one of the foundational bases of the ILO, was reaffirmed in the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, which is part of the ILO Constitution (Radin, 1987).

The assertion that labor is not a commodity appears to be a reaction against thinkers such as Adam Smith and even Karl Marx, who regarded labor as a commodity. However, if labor is not to be treated as a commodity, then following Kant’s view—that anything which has no exchange value possesses dignity—we must conclude that labor has dignity. Yet this conclusion seems logically flawed. In truth, it is the human being who has no price and cannot be treated as a means or instrument. Thus, the aforementioned principle can be understood and justified accordingly: it expresses an ethical imperative about labor, namely, that human labor is meaningless when abstracted from the individual and cannot be treated as a tradable object (Ghai, 2003). Therefore, in the labor relationship, the worker appears in their full human essence, and their human dignity must be respected and protected.

This moral proposition also has legal consequences. First and foremost, it entails the obligation to respect the worker’s human dignity. Furthermore, since labor does not exist independently and is always tied to the individual performing it, the labor contract does not involve a worker committing their property, but rather themselves undertaking to perform the work. Consequently, interpreting employment contracts as contracts for the sale or lease of persons or labor is incorrect and contrary to the worker’s human dignity.

The first step in recognizing the worker’s human dignity is linking labor to the worker’s personality and humanity, a connection with far-reaching significance and consequences. This conception of labor has been acknowledged in subsequent ILO documents. For instance, the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia states as one of the goals and aspirations of the ILO: “All human beings, irrespective of race, creed, or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity.” (Dauai, 1887)

This ideal is reiterated in the preambles of Conventions No. 104 (Abolition of Penal Sanctions for Indigenous Workers), No. 111 (Discrimination in Employment and Occupation), No. 122 (Employment Policy), and No. 156 (Workers with Family Responsibilities). Furthermore, Article 2(3) of Convention No. 107 (Indigenous and Tribal Populations) refers to the promotion of human dignity as a goal. Although the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work does not explicitly mention human dignity, it implicitly reflects its demands and strives to support it (Maslow, 1965).

Reference must also be made to the Decent Work Agenda, which has been on the ILO’s agenda since 1999. In his report to the 87th session of the International Labour Conference that year, the then ILO Director-General emphasized the need to humanize the global economy and reiterated the organization’s mission to advance the human dimension in the world of work. He identified the ILO’s primary goal as promoting and expanding opportunities for all men and women to access decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security, and human dignity. This new approach of the ILO is built on four strategic objectives: (1) promotion of fundamental labor rights, (2) employment, (3) social protection, and (4) social dialogue—all of which are regarded as vital and effective in realizing and affirming human dignity.

4.2. *The Scope of Human Dignity in Labor*

Articulating that the worker possesses human dignity and must be treated in accordance with that dignity is not a difficult task and does not require philosophical justification or elaborate discussion. This is because the subject is not a non-human or extraterrestrial being; rather, the worker is a human being who, by virtue of their humanity, must be respected. As a moral

consequence, they are entitled to human dignity—just as this reasoning applies to women, individuals with disabilities, or migrants. In other words, being disabled or impaired does not prevent one from being human; thus, such individuals are entitled to dignity by virtue of their humanity. Accordingly, since the worker is also a human being, they too possess human dignity.

The human dignity of the worker, on one hand, implies that they deserve respect in their social life like other humans and should enjoy rights or capabilities that secure and guarantee their dignity. On the other hand, it means that due to their status as a worker, they must specifically enjoy conditions at work that respect and do not violate their dignity. In this regard, contrary to ancient perceptions or the views of some anti-liberal thinkers discussed earlier, labor and being a worker are not in themselves inconsistent with human dignity. Rather, if a worker's labor is undertaken in conditions that respect and acknowledge their human dignity, work becomes a source of that dignity—since through it, a person provides for themselves and their family without relying on others and thus achieves self-esteem and personal respect (Dauai, 1887).

Through labor, an individual shapes their life and plays a role in social solidarity with others. According to Lord Beveridge, from a personal perspective, unemployment threatens one's self-respect. Employment is also socially beneficial, producing constructive and reassuring economic effects by promoting welfare and alleviating poverty and deprivation. Certainly, the right to work and support for employment guarantees one's autonomy and, therefore, is a requirement of human dignity. However, employment also necessitates appropriate conditions that affirm and preserve human dignity. In other words, workers should be provided with conditions during their employment that, on one hand, maintain and ensure their dignity and, on the other, prevent factors that may undermine it (Beveridge, 1909).

These appropriate conditions that protect workers' dignity are not easily listed—particularly given that the invocation of human dignity to defend workers' rights lacks a significant precedent in the social sciences and legal instruments. International, national, and legal texts rarely define specific manifestations of human dignity. Where such examples exist, they tend to be limited and context-specific. For instance, Article 23(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right to fair and satisfactory wages as a means to ensure human dignity. Similarly, the UK's Human Rights at Work Act (2001), while stating that “every worker has the right to human dignity at work,” narrowly interprets dignity in terms of the prohibition of bullying, harassment, or any act or omission that causes anxiety or distress.

Authors who have addressed human dignity in the context of work have mostly approached the subject from the field of management, focusing on self-esteem in work and concepts such as humanizing work through softer managerial practices, despecialization, teamwork, industrial democracy, and responsible autonomy. Others have emphasized factors that make work more meaningful and appealing. Many scholars also focus specifically on the prohibition of bullying and harassment as key violations of human dignity at work. Some writers, inspired by the ILO's concept of “decent work,” have discussed good and decent labor within the framework and tools outlined by the ILO (Maslow, 1965).

These approaches to human dignity at work remain narrow in scope and fail to encompass many fundamental rights derived from human dignity. Human dignity precedes rights, meaning that rights and duties are necessary to uphold and guarantee that dignity. Respecting the inherent worth and personal autonomy of every human being is a core requirement of the principle of human dignity. In the context of labor relations, this principle likewise gives rise to rights and obligations. As a legal principle, human dignity governs labor relations. Thus, the worker and their work are not distinct or detached concepts; rather, the worker, by virtue of being human, possesses inherent dignity and must enjoy respect for their intrinsic worth and autonomy.

Respecting the intrinsic worth and autonomy of the worker gives rise to rights and obligations which, when recognized in any legal text or instrument, constitute fundamental human rights because they belong to the human being regardless of any other attributes. It may thus be concluded that the worker's human dignity requires that they enjoy conditions appropriate to their dignity. Dignified working conditions are those that respect the individual's inherent worth and autonomy. These conditions involve fundamental rights of a human rights nature that must be respected. Such rights may include, for example, the right to life and its implications such as occupational safety and health; the right to personal integrity, which encompasses a broad range of rights including protection from psychological and sexual harassment and access to leave related to illness and maternity; the right to equality and non-discrimination; various freedoms including those of belief and religion within the workplace; the right to form and join trade unions; and any other right derived from the individual's intrinsic worth and autonomy.

5. Conclusion

The dominant approach in contemporary legal literature is to link certain labor-related rights with human rights. However, this matter remains highly contested and controversial. This article sought to provide a foundation for recognizing labor-related rights as human rights through an appeal to human dignity, and to identify their specific instances. It was argued that workers, by virtue of their humanity, enjoy human dignity both in their social lives and in the workplace. Legally, the consequence of this dignity is that workers must enjoy rights that either support or derive from their dignity.

Accordingly, rights that concern the intrinsic worth of the worker as a human being—such as the right to life, personal integrity, equality, and autonomy in the workplace—must be respected and protected. Therefore, by invoking human dignity: first, labor-related rights are just as morally imperative and essential as human rights; second, labor-related rights may also be regarded as universal human rights; third, the lack or inadequacy of resources does not justify limiting workers' access to labor-related rights to what is economically feasible—there are minimum standards that must be upheld; and fourth, although the manifestations of these rights may evolve with technological change, the rights themselves remain enduring and timeless.

Moreover, labor-related rights, in light of human dignity, impose obligations on states to adopt measures to support the dignity of workers. This means that, in addition to employers having duties to respect the worker's dignity, the state is also bound and obligated—for example, by ensuring conditions of autonomy for workers through tools such as social security and procedural and legal protections.

Ethical Considerations

All procedures performed in this study were under the ethical standards.

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Conflict of Interest

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