Exemption from Criminal Responsibility and Immunity from Punishment in International Crimes Before the International Criminal Court

Abstract

This study aims to elucidate the legal framework governing the exemption from criminal responsibility and immunity from punishment under the Rome Statute by analyzing its theoretical foundations, legal structure, and the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology, the research examines the content of ICC documents, legal books and articles, and landmark cases such as Thomas Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06, 2012), Dominic Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15, 2021), Germain Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07, 2014), and Omar al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09, 2019) to assess the Court’s legal system and judicial practice. A comparative approach is also adopted to contrast national and international legal frameworks. The findings indicate that the Court adopts a conservative stance regarding exceptions by strictly interpreting Articles 31 to 33, emphasizing both objective and subjective criteria to prevent misuse of defenses. The distinction between justification for criminal conduct (such as self-defense) and exemption from punishment (such as duress) plays a pivotal role in the Court's jurisprudence. However, legal ambiguities—such as the definition of “imminent threat” or the “absence of a reasonable alternative”—alongside practical obstacles like lack of state cooperation and evidence-gathering limitations, pose serious challenges. International legal doctrine, underscoring the need to restrict exceptions, has proposed more coherent criteria for future legal development. The results of the study suggest that while the Rome Statute provides a structured legal framework for exemption from criminal responsibility and immunity from punishment, it still requires reforms to resolve legal ambiguities, enhance international cooperation, and increase the Court’s legitimacy.