Digital Competition Law: Antitrust Implications of Big Tech Platforms

Authors

    Sophie Chenier Department of International Relations, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
    Rajeev Kumar * Department of Public Law, University of Delhi, Delhi, India rajeev.kumar@du.ac.in

Keywords:

Digital competition law, antitrust, Big Tech platforms, data governance, algorithmic power, merger control, platform neutrality, interoperability, contestability, digital markets

Abstract

Digital markets have evolved into complex ecosystems shaped by data-driven business models, algorithmic decision-making, and powerful network effects. As platforms such as Google, Apple, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, and TikTok have become central intermediaries for communication, commerce, and information exchange, traditional antitrust frameworks—constructed around price effects, discrete product markets, and observable competitive constraints—have become increasingly inadequate. This narrative review examines the emergence of digital competition law as a distinct regulatory field capable of addressing the structural, informational, and architectural features of digital dominance. Through descriptive analysis, the article assesses how platform power is exercised through mechanisms such as self-preferencing, cross-service data aggregation, ecosystem bundling, and algorithmic manipulation, all of which create durable competitive advantages that resist traditional antitrust scrutiny. The review then analyzes doctrinal challenges in applying competition law to digital markets, including difficulties in defining relevant markets, evaluating non-price harms, and proving exclusionary conduct in opaque algorithmic environments. Comparative insights from major jurisdictions—including the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Australia, India, and China—demonstrate varying regulatory philosophies but a shared recognition of the need for ex-ante obligations, interoperability mandates, enhanced merger scrutiny, and integrated data governance frameworks. Emerging theories such as the Neo-Brandeisian approach, platform neutrality, and fairness-based regulation highlight shifts toward structural remedies and broader public-interest considerations. The review concludes that digital competition law must evolve continuously to address the expanding influence of Big Tech platforms and ensure that digital markets remain contestable, transparent, and aligned with democratic and economic values. By synthesizing theoretical debates, global policy developments, and regulatory challenges, the article contributes to a deeper understanding of how competition law can adapt to the realities of platform-based economies.

References

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Published

2023-04-01

Submitted

2023-02-13

Revised

2023-03-13

Accepted

2023-03-27

How to Cite

Chenier, S., & Kumar, R. (2023). Digital Competition Law: Antitrust Implications of Big Tech Platforms. Legal Studies in Digital Age, 2(2), 49-60. https://jlsda.com/index.php/lsda/article/view/308

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