Smart Adaptation to Climate Change: Reconsidering Its Relationship with the Principles of International Environmental Law and Adaptive Regulation

Abstract

Adaptation to climate change, as a complementary strategy to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, has largely been described in the literature of international environmental law as a soft and indeterminate obligation; an obligation that, in foundational instruments such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and even the Paris Agreement, has mostly remained within the framework of conditional and guiding language and lacks a clear legal enforcement mechanism. Adopting a descriptive-analytical approach, this article reconsiders the emerging concept of “smart adaptation” in light of the customary principles of international environmental law—particularly the precautionary principle, the principle of prevention, and the principle of environmental impact assessment—as well as the principles of environmental democracy. The findings of the study indicate that smart adaptation, as distinct from conventional adaptation and in contrast to the concept of maladaptation, is grounded in data-driven decision-making, predictability, principled flexibility, and participatory governance. By relying on a systematic cycle of planning, assessment, implementation, and monitoring, it can partially compensate for the gaps in the soft obligations contained in international instruments such as the Paris Agreement. The experience of the European Union in the document “Forging a Climate-Resilient Europe” (2021), which is structured around the three axes of smarter, more systemic, and faster adaptation, represents an example of the practical realization of this regulatory model. The article concludes that the principle of coordination and integration, the principle of continuous supervision and monitoring, and the principle of principled flexibility constitute the fundamental pillars of smart adaptation regulation, and that their realization, particularly in countries such as Iran, will face structural obstacles in the absence of binding national legal frameworks.